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The connection between theoretical and applied cryptography is often not well established
due to difficulties in translating the theoretical security proofs to real world software and
hardware implementations. Cryptanalysis is an important branch in cryptology and focuses
on breaking cryptographic primitives and protocols. Side-channel analysis is a cryptana-
lytic technique born from practice. Physical side-channel cryptanalysis is a very effective
approach to break a secure cryptographic system. These attacks are based on signals gen-
erated from a processor while it carries out computations. These signals include electro-
magnetic (EM) emanations created by current flow within the device’s computational and
power-delivery circuitry [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6], variation in power consumption [7, 8, 9, 10, 11,
12, 13, 14, 15, 16], sound [17, 18, 19, 20], and also temperature [21, 22].
Most side-channel attacks on cryptographic primitives and implementations rely on
different control flow or memory access patterns. As a countermeasure, the cryptographic
community has established the notion of constant time program code, which is designed
to offer protection from microarchitectural attacks [23, 24], and also from simple single-
trace power analysis attacks [25, 26, 27]. At a high level, constant time program code
is implemented such that the execution time, control-flow, and memory access pattern,
are all independent of the value of the program’s secrets from attacker-observable leakage
sources. This notion of security is standardized [28] and enforced by the cryptographic
implementations, i.e., OpenSSL, Libgcrypt, etc.
Overall, existing implementations of cryptographic primitives are designed to miti-
gate previously known physical and cache-based side-channel attacks by removing key-
dependent timing variation and large operand-dependent changes in overall activity during
big-number operations, e.g. use of low Hamming-weight operands in large-number multi-
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plication operations during RSA modular exponentiation. However, existing cryptographic
implementations do not consider operand-dependent activity during brief operations, such
as reading a bit of the secret key, possibly because these operations were considered diffi-
cult to precisely identify and/or exploit in attacks.
While there are various optimization considerations and counter-measures enforced for
the public key cryptographic primitives and implementations, there exist some signal differ-
ences created by systematic differences in operand values during secret value computation.
Capturing and identifying emanated signals while processing this sensitive information,
although very minute, make it possible to break the secret key.
This information leakage is hard to detect by software developers as it requires high
level of expertise on the hardware design of computer systems and compiler optimization.
Additionally, since discovering or detecting side-channel information leakage is not part
of the standard developer practices, it is hard to detect vulnerabilities due to side/covert
channels. Nevertheless, this type of attack represents a serious and immediate threat to the
security of Internet societies who use these primitives.
The research presented here is motivated by the ongoing and young field of research
trying to exploit leakage of side-channel information to mount key recovery attacks against
software implementations of cryptographic primitives that are believed to be secure. This
thesis focuses on detailing a set of new techniques to exploit widely used open sources
for software implementations of cryptographic primitives. The work embraces the impor-
tance of re-thinking before designing and implementing public key cryptography (PKC), in
general. It was widely believed that constant time program code does not produce easily-
observable operand-dependent physical leakage and is protected from the analysis based on
power and EM emanations. This thesis primarily addresses the following questions: (1) Is
constant time program code resilient to power and EM analyses? (2) How can an attacker
extract a secret key from such an implementation?
We observe that, while a constant-time implementation ensures that the control-flow
2
and cache-block access sequence is the same regardless of the secret key, that results in very
stable timing that can be used to very precisely locate (in the overall timeline of the signal)
the signal snippet that corresponds to a specific brief part of the computation, e.g. the signal
that corresponds to operations on individual bits of the secret key t. If, as we have found
in several cryptographic implementations, that brief part of the computation considers only
one bit of the key (at a time), and if the two possible values of the bit result in even a
very small (in magnitude) and very brief (in time) difference in side-channel signals, the
bit is at risk of being recovered from the signal using a binary (only two possible decisions)
classifier.
This thesis exhibits that constant-time implementations of cryptographic primitives can
be vulnerable against physical side-channel EM attacks.
1.1 Research Contributions
The main overall contributions of this thesis are as follows:
1. We demonstrate that snippets of the signal that are of interest for cryptanalysis can
be identified very precisely given the overall signal that corresponds to the entire
cryptographic operation, e.g. a decryption or a signing operation.
2. We demonstrate that, given the signal snippets in which individual bits of the key are
used as operands, the small-magnitude and short-duration key-bit-dependent changes
in the signal are sufficient for a binary (only two possible decisions) classifier to
extract the value of that bit.
3. We propose mitigations that are intended to force the classifier to make decisions
among many-possibilities (rather than binary decisions). We achieve this by refactor-
ing the code, when possible, to operate on groups of secret bits rather than individual
bits, and by introducing randomization of secret-dependent operands.
3
1.2 One&Done: A Single-Decryption EM-Based Attack on OpenSSL’s Constant-
Time Blinded RSA
Prior physical side-channel attacks on PKC implementations rely on classifying signals
corresponding to a large-integer square and multiply operations [29, 30, 31]. The focus
on identifying this long-lasting subsequence was to identify the overall sequence of sam-
ples corresponding to the entire exponentiation. The classification of these long-lasting
square-multiplications would be difficult when the sequence of square-multiplications are
not key dependent and when the attacker cannot control the input message that would be
exponentiated.
Keeping this in mind, OpenSSL implements constant-time Montgomery ladder to
counter the square-multiply sequence identification. To counter cache timing attacks, OpenSSL
enforces scatter-gather technique where a random cache space is used to fetch pre-computed
values. These techniques prevent the key exploitation presented in [29, 30, 31] when
OpenSSL computes constant-time window exponentiation.
One&Done presents a side-channel attack that is based on the analysis of signals that
correspond to the brief computation activity that computes the value of each window dur-
ing exponentiation, i.e. activity between large-integer multiplications. A uniform pattern
of multiplication computation helps us locate the exact position of each edges of that multi-
plication and reading a single bit from the key helps us classify the bit computation of zero
and one. Most prior works focused on the large-integer multiplications themselves and/or
the table lookups that obtain the multiplicand for the computed window value. The val-
ues these computations operate on are related to the individual bits of the secret exponent
and not the message (cipher text). This absence of message-induced variation allows the
small variation caused by different values of an individual exponent bit to “stand out” in the
signal and be accurately matched to signals from training. More importantly, this message-
independence makes the new attack completely immune to existing countermeasures that
4
focus on thwarting chosen-ciphertext attacks and/or square/multiply sequence analysis.
To mitigate the side-channel vulnerability exposed by our attack approach, instead of
reading a single secret bit, we read a branch of bits which makes 32 choices for 5-bit win-
dow length rather than the 2 choices before the mitigation. We change the window value
computation to obtain a full integer’s worth of bits from the exponent, then mask that value
to obtain the window value, rather than constructing the window value one bit at a time
with large-number Montgomery multiplication between these one-bit window-value up-
dates. This mitigation causes the signal variation during the brief window computation to
depend on tens of bits of the exponent as a group, i.e. the signal variation introduced by one
bit in the exponent during the window computation is now superimposed to the variation
introduced by the other bits in the group, instead of having each bit’s variation alone in its
own signal snippet. Our experiments show that this mitigation actually improves exponen-
tiation performance slightly and, more importantly, with this mitigation the recovery rate
for the exponents bits becomes equivalent to random guessing.
1.3 Nonce@Once: A Single-Trace EM Side Channel Attack on ECDSA in GnuPG/-
libgcrypt and OpenSSL
To mitigate side-channel attacks, in recent versions of cryptographic packages, such as
GnuPG/libgcrypt and OpenSSL, point and message blinding is applied prior to per-
forming point-scalar multiplication, to prevent chosen-message and chosen-base-point at-
tacks. The point-scalar multiplication itself is implemented such that the execution time,
control-flow, and memory access pattern, are all independent of the value of the (secret)
scalar.
Nonce@Once presents a side-channel attack that recovers the secret ECDSA key by
analyzing the signal that corresponds to a single ECDSA signing operation in the current (as
of this writing) versions of libgcrypt and OpenSSL. In this implementation, the end of
an add-double operation is clearly and precisely identifiable in the signal, and the constant-
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time nature of the implementation implies that the program activity that follows, which
contains activity that corresponds to reading the next bit of the key from an array, can also
be precisely located in the timeline of the signal. Furthermore, since the implementation
reads one bit of the key at a time, a binary classifier can be used to determine, for each
such snippet of the signal, the value of the secret bit that was used. Specifically, our attack
1) identifies the signal snippet that corresponds to each instance of the conditional swap
operation, 2) determines which of the two possible values of the swap condition each signal
snippet corresponds to, 3) uses the values of the swap conditions, which directly correspond
to individual bits of the secret nonce in an ECDSA signing operation, to construct the set
of possible nonce values and 4) reconstructs the full private/public ECDSA key pair.
Finally, we propose a mitigation based on randomizing the exclusive-or mask in the
conditional swap operation, which avoids creating a systematic condition-dependent dif-
ference in operand values for exclusive-or operations during the conditional swap. We
have confirmed that this mitigation is effective in preventing this and similar attacks, and
are currently working on submitting this mitigation to both GnuPG and OpenSSL, and
expect the mitigation to be merged into both source code repositories prior to publication
of this work.
1.4 Rethinking DSA Implementations: A New Attack Method With A Few EM
Traces
While various optimization and counter-measures are enforced for public key cryptography
(PKC) implementations, there exist some so called ”glue-codes” which exhibit key depen-
dency. Capturing emanated signals while executing these ”glue-codes” can lead to break
PKC implementations.
In that respect, we present a new physical side-channel attack on PKC implementa-
tions of OpenSSL. In particular, we consider DSA implementation as a use case, which
utilizes constant-time fixed-window (m-ary) modular exponentiation. A uniform pattern of
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constant-time multiplication helps us locate the exact position of each edge of that multi-
plication (phase I of the attack) and reading a single bit from the key helps us to predict
whether that bit is zero or one (phase II of the attack). Our attack is based on the electro-
magnetic (EM) emissions generated while the device performs cryptographic operations,
such as digital signature and verification. We have observed that there exist meaningful
EM emissions during ”Window” computation for DSA sliding and fixed window imple-
mentations. We can split the proposed attack into two phases as training and detection.
In the first phase, we train our system using different per-message keys, which are cap-
tured EM images of window computations for different keys followed by processing the
EM signals in the time-domain. In the detection phase, with a single trace, we compare
the images of window computations of test signals with trained signals. We found that our
approach can detect 99% exponent bits for constant time DSA implementations. We also
propose some counter-measures to hinder this vulnerability. With the proposed counter-
measures implemented on the current OpenSSL, we could not detect more than 50% bits
for fixed-window. We demonstrated different implementation aspects and their effects as
countermeasures which embrace the importance of re-thinking before designing and im-
plementing PKC, in general. To evaluate the robustness and effectiveness of our attacks
and corresponding counter-measures, we ported the latest version(at the time of our exper-
iment) of OpenSSL (1.1.0g) to two cell phones and one embedded device, and executed
applications that use the OpenSSL sign/verify libraries. We demonstrate that our approach
works across different devices.
1.5 NAF Based OpenSSL and its Vulnerability
Before switching to using constant-time implementations of point multiplication during
ECDSA signing, OpenSSL used to use NAF based point multiplication. This work presents
a side-channel attack that recovers the secret ephemeral secret scalar (nonce) used in the
elliptic curve point multiplication by a scalar in ECDSA, using the signal that corresponds
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to a single signing operation of OpenSSL. In this work we have shown that NAF based im-
plementation is completely exploitable, where 100% of secret nonce can be retrieved. We
further have shown that wNAF (where w = 3) based implementation is partially exploitable,
where 70% of secret nonce can be retrieved.
1.6 Thesis Outline
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 describes One&Done:
A Single-Decryption EM-Based Attack on OpenSSL’s Constant-Time Blinded RSA. In
Chapter 3 we present Nonce@Once: A Single-Trace EM Side Channel Attack on Several
Constant-Time Elliptic Curve Implementations. We demonstrate how constant time ECC
program code resilient to simple EM analysis. Chapter 4 describes attack on DSA and
different implementation aspects and their effects as countermeasures. Chapter 5 describes
the vulnerabilities on NAF based OpenSSL implementations.
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CHAPTER 2
ONE&DONE: A SINGLE-DECRYPTION EM-BASED ATTACK ON OPENSSL’S
CONSTANT-TIME BLINDED RSA
2.1 Abstract
This chapter presents the first side channel attack approach that, without relying on the
cache organization and/or timing, retrieves the secret exponent from a single decryption on
arbitrary ciphertext in a modern (current version of OpenSSL) fixed-window constant-time
implementation of RSA. Specifically, the attack recovers the exponent’s bits during modu-
lar exponentiation from analog signals that are unintentionally produced by the processor
as it executes the constant-time code that constructs the value of each “window” in the ex-
ponent, rather than the signals that correspond to squaring/multiplication operations and/or
cache behavior during multiplicand table lookup operations. The approach is demonstrated
using electromagnetic (EM) emanations on two mobile phones and an embedded system,
and after only one decryption in a fixed-window RSA implementation it recovers enough
bits of the secret exponents to enable very efficient (within seconds) reconstruction of the
full private RSA key.
Since the value of the ciphertext is irrelevant to our attack, the attack succeeds even
when the ciphertext is unknown and/or when message randomization (blinding) is used.
Our evaluation uses signals obtained by demodulating the signal from a relatively narrow
band (40 MHz) around the processor’s clock frequency (around 1GHz), which is within the
capabilities of compact sub-$1,000 software-defined radio (SDR) receivers.
Finally, we propose a mitigation where the bits of the exponent are only obtained from
an exponent in integer-sized groups (tens of bits) rather than obtaining them one bit at a
time. This mitigation is effective because it forces the attacker to attempt recovery of tens
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of bits from a single brief snippet of signal, rather than having a separate signal snippet for
each individual bit. This mitigation has been submitted to OpenSSL and was merged into
its master source code branch prior to the publication of this chapter.
2.2 Motivation
Side channel attacks extract sensitive information, such as cryptographic keys, from sig-
nals created by electronic activity within computing devices as they carry out computation.
These signals include electromagnetic emanations created by current flows within the de-
vice’s computational and power-delivery circuitry [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6], variation in power
consumption [7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16], and also sound [17, 18, 19, 20], tempera-
ture [21, 22], and chasis potential variation [11] that can mostly be attributed to variation in
power consumption and its interaction with the system’s power delivery circuitry. Finally,
not all side channel attacks use analog signals: some use faults [32, 33], caches [34, 35,
36], branch predictors [37], etc.
Most of the research on physical side-channel attacks has focused on relatively simple
devices, such as smartcards and simple embedded systems, where the side-channel signals
can be acquired with bandwidth much higher than the clock rates of the target processor
and other relevant circuitry (e.g. hardware accelerators for encryption/decryption), and
usually with highly intrusive access to the device, e.g. with small probes placed directly
onto the chip’s package [38, 14]. Recently, attacks on higher-clock-rate devices, such as
smartphones and PCs , have been demonstrated [39, 40, 4, 41]. They have shown that phys-
ical side channel attacks are possible even when signals are acquired with bandwidth that
is much lower than the (gigahertz-range) clock rates of the processor, with less-intrusive
access to the device, and even though advanced performance-oriented features, such as
super-scalar (multiple instructions per cycle) execution and instruction scheduling, and sys-
tem software activity, such as interrupts and multiprocessing, cause significant variation in
both shape and timing of the signal produced during cryptographic activity.
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To overcome the problem of low bandwidth and variation, successful attacks on high-
clock-rate systems tend to focus on parts of the signal that correspond to activity that takes
many processor cycles. A representative example of this is decryption in RSA, which con-
sists of modular exponentiation of the ciphertext with an exponent that is derived from the
private key. The attacker’s goal is to recover enough bits of that secret exponent through
side-channel analysis, and use that information to compute the remaining parts of the se-
cret key. Most of the computational activity in large-integer modular exponentiation is
devoted to multiplication and squaring operations, where each squaring (or multiplication)
operation operates on large integers and thus takes many processor cycles.
Prior physical side-channel attacks on RSA rely on classifying the signals that cor-
respond to large-integer square and multiply operations that together represent the vast
majority of the computational work when performing large-integer exponentiation [42, 40,
11, 19]. Between these long-lasting square and multiply operations are the few processor
instructions that are needed to obtain the next bit (or group of bits) of the secret exponent
and use that to select whether the next large-integer operation will be squaring or multi-
plication, and/or which operands to supply to that operation. The focus on long-lasting
operations is understandable, given that side channel attacks ultimately recover informa-
tion by identifying the relevant sub-sequences of signal samples and assessing which of
the possible categories is the best match for each sub-sequence. The sub-sequences that
correspond to large-integer operations produce long sub-sequences of samples, so they 1)
are easier to identify in the overall sequence of samples that corresponds to the entire ex-
ponentiation, and 2) provide enough signal samples for successful classification even when
using relatively low sampling rates.
However, the operands in these large-integer operations are each very regular in terms
of the sequence of instructions they perform, and the operands used in those instructions are
ciphertext-dependent, so classification of signals according to exponent-related properties
is difficult unless 1) the sequence of square and multiply operations is key-dependent or 2)
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the attacker can control the ciphertext that will be exponentiated, and chooses the ciphertext
in a way that produces systematically different side channel signals for each of the possible
exponent-dependent choices of operands.
2.2.1 Our Contributions
In this chapter we present a side-channel attack that is based on analysis of signals that
correspond to the brief computation activity that computes the value of each window dur-
ing exponentiation, i.e. activity between large-integer multiplications, in contrast to most
prior work that focuses on the large-integer multiplications themselves and/or the table
lookups that obtain the multiplicand for the computed window value. The short duration
of these window value computations may hinder signal-based classification to some extent.
However, the values these computations operate on are related to the individual bits of the
secret exponent and not the message (ciphertext). This absence of message-induced vari-
ation allows the small variation caused by different values of an individual exponent bit
to “stand out” in the signal and be accurately matched to signals from training. More im-
portantly, this message-independence makes the new attack completely immune to existing
countermeasures that focus on thwarting chosen-ciphertext attacks and/or square/multiply
sequence analysis.
The experimental evaluation of our attack approach was performed on two Android-
based mobile phones and an embedded system board, all with ARM processors operating
at high (800 MHz to 1.1 GHz) frequencies, and the signal is acquired in the 40 MHz band
around the clock frequency, resulting in a sample rate that is <5% of the processor’s clock
frequency, and well within the signal capture capabilities of compact commercially avail-
able sub-$1,000 software-defined radio (SDR) receivers such as the Ettus B200-mini. The
RSA implementation we target is the constant-time fixed-window implementation used in
OpenSSL [43] version 1.1.0g, the latest version of OpenSSL at the time this chapter was
written. Our results show that our attack approach correctly recovers between 95.7% and
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99.6% (depending on the target system) of the secret exponents’ bits from the signal that
corresponds to a single instance of RSA decryption, and we further verify that the infor-
mation from each instance of RSA encryption/signing in our experiments was sufficient to
quickly (on average <1 second of execution time) fully reconstruct the private RSA key
that was used.
To further evaluate our attack approach, we apply it to a sliding-window implemen-
tation of modular exponentiation in OpenSSL – this was the default implementation in
OpenSSL until Percival et al. [44] demonstrated that its key-dependent square/multiply se-
quence makes it vulnerable to side channel attacks. We show that in this implementation
our approach also recovers nearly all of the secret-exponent bits from a single use (expo-
nentiation) of that secret exponent.
To mitigate the side-channel vulnerability exposed by our attack approach, we change
the window value computation to obtain a full integer’s worth of bits from the exponent,
then mask that value to obtain the window value, rather than constructing the window
value one bit at a time with large-number Montgomery multiplication between these one-
bit window-value updates. This mitigation causes the signal variation during the brief
window computation to depend on tens of bits of the exponent as a group, i.e. the signal
variation introduced by one bit in the exponent during the window computation is now
superimposed to the variation introduced by the other bits in the group, instead of having
each bit’s variation alone in its own signal snippet. Our experiments show that this miti-
gation actually improves exponentiation performance slightly and, more importantly, that
with this mitigation the recovery rate for the exponents bits becomes equivalent to random
guessing. This mitigation has been submitted to OpenSSL and was merged into its master




Our attack model assumes that there is an adversary who wishes to obtain the secret key
used for RSA-based public-key encryption or authentication. We further assume that the
adversary can bring a relatively compact receiver into close proximity of the system per-
forming these RSA secret-key operation, for example a smart-infrastructure or smart-city
device which uses public key infrastructure (PKI) to authenticate itself and secure its com-
munication over the Internet, and which is located in a public location, or that the adversary
can hide a relatively compact receiver in a location where systems can be placed in close
proximity to it, e.g. under a cellphone charging station at a public location, under the
tabletop surface in a coffee shop, etc.).
We assume that the adversary can access another device of the same type as the one
being attacked, which is a highly realistic assumption in most attack scenarios described
above, and perform RSA decryption/authentication with known keys in preparation for
the attack. Unlike many prior attacks on RSA, we do not assume that the adversary can
choose (or even know) the message (ciphertext for RSA decryption) to which the private
key will be applied, and we further assume that the RSA implementation under attack
does utilize blinding to prevent such chosen-ciphertext attacks. Finally, we assume that
it is highly desirable for the attacker to recover the secret key after only very few uses
(ideally only one use) of that key on the target device. This is a very realistic assumption
because PKI is typically used only to set up a secure connection, typically to establish the
authenticity of the communication parties and establish a symmetric-encryption session
key, so in scenarios where the attacker’s receiver can only be in close proximity to the
target device for a limited time, very few uses of the private RSA key may be observed.
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Targeted Software
The software we target is OpenSSL version 1.1.0g [43], the latest version of OpenSSL at
the time this chapter was written. Its RSA decryption uses constant-time fixed-window
large-number modular exponentiation to mitigate both timing-based attacks and attacks
that exploit the exponent-dependent variation in the square-multiply sequence. The lookup
tables used to update the result at the end of each window are stored in scattered form to
mitigate attacks that examine the cache and memory behavior when reading these tables,
and the RSA implementation supports blinding (which we turn on in our experiments) to
mitigate chosen-ciphertext attacks.
Targeted Hardware
The hardware we target are two modern Android-based smartphones and a Linux-based
embedded system board, all with ARM processor clocked at frequencies around 1GHz.
In our experiments we place probes very close, but without physical contact with the (un-
opened) case of the phone, while for the embedded system board we position the probes
20 cm away from the board, so we consider the demonstrated attacks close-proximity but
non-intrusive.
Current Status of Mitigation
The mitigation described in this chapter has been submitted as a patch for integration
into the main branch of OpenSSL. This patch was merged into the “master” branch of
OpenSSL’s source code on May 20th, 2018, before this chapter was published.
2.3 Background
Long-lasting operations (such as large-integer square and multiply operations) facilitate
matching by producing numerous signals samples even when the signal is collected at a
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1 / / r e s u l t r s t a r t s o u t as 1
2 BN one ( r ) ;
3 / / For each b i t o f e x p o n e n t d
4 f o r ( b= b i t s −1;b>=0;b−−){
5 / / r = r ∗ r mod m
6 BN mod mul ( r , r , r ,m) ;
7 i f ( B N i s b i t s e t ( d , b ) )
8 / / r = r ∗c mod m
9 BN mod mul ( r , r , c ,m) ;
10 }
Figure 2.1: A simple implementation of large-number modular exponentiation
limited sample rate.
A representative example is RSA’s decryption, which at its core performs modular ex-
ponentiation of the ciphertext c with a secret exponent (d) modulo m or, in more a efficient
implementation that rely on the Chinese Reminder Theorem (CRT), two such exponentia-
tions, with secret exponents dp and dq with modulo p and q, respectively. The side-channel
analysis thus seeks to recover either d or, in CRT-based implementations, dp and dq, using
side-channel measurements obtained while exponentiation is performed.
The exponentiation is implemented as either left-to-right (starting with the most sig-
nificant bits) or right-to-left (starting with the least significant bits) traversal of the bits of
the exponents, using large-integer modular multiplication to update the result until the full
exponentiation is complete. Left-to-right implementations are more common, and without
loss of generality we use c to denote the ciphertext, d for the secret exponent, and m for the
modulus. A simple implementation of exponentiation considers one exponent bit at a time,
as shown in Figure 2.1, which is adapted from OpenSSL’s source code.
The BN prefix in Figure 2.1 stands for “Big Number” (i.e. large integer). Each large
integer is represented by a vector of limbs, where a limb is an ordinary (machine-word-
sized) integers. The BN is bit set(d,b) function returns the value (0 or 1) of the b-th
bit of large-integer exponent d, which only requires a few processor instructions: compute
the index of the array element that contains the requested bit, load that element, then shift
and bit-mask to keep only the requested bit. The instructions that implement the loop, the
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if statement, and function call/return are also relatively few in number.
However, the BN mod mul operation is much more time-consuming: it requires nu-
merous multiplication instructions that operate on the limbs of the large-integer multipli-
cands. Large integers c, d, and m (or, in CRT-based implementations the dq, dp and the cor-
responding moduli), all haveO(n) bits and thusO(n) limbs, where n is the size of the RSA
cryptographic key. A grade-school implementation of BN mod mul thus requires O(n2)
limb multiplications, but the Karatsuba multiplication algorithm [45] is typically used to
reduces this to O(nlog23) ≈ O(n1.585), In most modern implementations a significant fur-
ther performance improvement is achieved by converting the ciphertext to a Montgomery
representation, using Montgomery multiplication for BN mod mul during exponentiation,
and at the end converting the result r back to the standard representation.
Even with Montgomery multiplication, however, the vast majority of execution time
for large-number exponentiation is spent on large-number multiplications, so performance
optimizations focus on reducing the number of these multiplications. Likewise, most of
the side-channel measurements (e.g. signal samples) collected during large-number ex-
ponentiation correspond to large-number multiplication activity, so existing side channel
cryptanalysis approaches tend to target multiplication activity.
One class of attacks focuses on distinguishing between squaring (r ∗ r) and multipli-
cation (r ∗ c) operations, and recovering information about the secret exponent from the
sequence in which they occur. Examples of such attacks include FLUSH+RELOAD [46]
(which uses instruction cache behavior) and Percival’s attack [44], which uses data cache
behavior. In the naive implementation above, an occurrence of squaring tells the attacker
that the next bit of the exponent is being used, and an occurrence of multiplication indi-
cates that the value of that bit is 1, so an attack that correctly recovers the square-multiply
sequence can trivially obtain all bits of the secret exponent.
To improve performance, most modern implementations use window-based exponenti-
ation, where squaring is needed for each bit of the exponent, but a multiplication is needed
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only once per a multi-bit group (called a window) of exponent bits. A left-to-right (start-
ing at the most significant bit) sliding-window implementation scans the exponent bits and
forms windows of varying length. Since a window that contains only zero bits requires no
multiplication (and thus cannot benefit from forming multi-bit windows), only windows
that begin and end with 1-valued bits are allowed to form multi-bit windows, whereas zero
bits in-between these windows are each treated as their own single-bit windows that can
omit multiplication. A sliding-window implementation is shown in Figure 2.2, using code
adapted from OpenSSL’s source code for sliding-window modular exponentiation. The
sliding-window approach chooses a maximum size wmax for the windows it will use, pre-
computes a table ct that contains the large-integer value cwvalmodm for each possible value
wval up to wmax length, and then scans the exponent, forming windows and updating the
result for each window.
In this algorithm, a squaring (lines 7 and 26 in Figure 2.2) is performed for each bit
while the multiplication operation (line 29) is performed only at the (1-valued) LSB of a
non-zero window. Thus the square-multiply sequence reveals where some of the 1-valued
bits in the exponent are, and additional bits of the exponent have been shown to be recov-
erable [42] by analyzing the number of squaring between each pair of multiplications. The
fraction of bits that can be recovered from the square-multiply sequence depends on the
maximum window size wmax, but commonly used values of wmax are relatively small
and prior work [42] has experimentally demonstrated recovery of 49% of the exponent’s
bits on average when wmax = 4 based on the square-multiply sequence. Additional tech-
niques [42, 47] have been shown to recover the full RSA private key once enough of the
exponent bits are known, and for wmax = 4 this has allowed full key recovery for 28%
of the keys [42]. Finally, recent work has shown that fine-grained control flow tracking
through analog side channels can be very accurate [48]. Because this sliding-window im-
plementation uses each bit of the exponent to make at least one control flow decision, highly
accurate control flow reconstruction amounts to discovering the exponent’s bits with some
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1 BN one ( r ) ;
2 w s t a r t = b i t s −1;
3 whi le ( w s t a r t >=0){
4 i f ( ! B N i s b i t s e t ( d , w s t a r t ) ) {
5 / / Window i s 0 , sq ua re and
6 / / b e g i n a new window
7 BN mod mul ( r , r , r ,m) ;
8 w s t a r t −−;
9 c o n t in u e ;
10 }
11 wval =1 ;
12 w=1;
13 / / Scan up t o max window l e n g t h
14 f o r ( i =1 ; i<wmax ; i ++){
15 / / Don ’ t go below e x p o n e n t ’ s LSB
16 i f ( w s t a r t−i <0)
17 break ;
18 / / I f 1 e x t e n d window t o i t
19 i f ( B N i s b i t s e t ( d , w s t a r t−i ) ) {
20 wval =( wval<<(i−w+1) ) +1;
21 w= i ;
22 }
23 }
24 / / Square r e s u l t w t i m e s
25 f o r ( i =0 ; i<w; i ++)
26 BN mod mul ( r , r , r ,m) ;
27 / / M u l t i p l y window ’ s r e s u l t
28 / / i n t o o v e r a l l r e s u l t
29 BN mod mul ( r , r , c t [ wval >>1],m) ;
30 / / Begin a new window
31 w s t a r t −=w;
32 }
Figure 2.2: Sliding-window implementation of large-number modular exponentiation
probability of error.
Concerns about the exponent-dependent square-multiply sequences have led to adop-
tion of fixed window exponentiation in OpenSSL, which combines the performance ad-
vantages of window-based implementation with an exponent-independent square-multiply
sequence. This implementation is represented in Figure 2.3, again adapted from OpenSSL’s
source code.
All windows now have the same number of bits w, with exactly one multiplication per-
formed for each window – in fact, all of the control flow is now exactly the same regardless
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1 b= b i t s −1;
2 whi le ( b>=0){
3 wval =0 ;
4 / / Scan t h e window ,
5 / / s q u a r i n g t h e r e s u l t as we go
6 f o r ( i =0 ; i<w; i ++) {
7 BN mod mul ( r , r , r ,m) ;
8 wval<<=1;
9 wval+= B N i s b i t s e t ( d , b ) ;
10 b−−;
11 }
12 / / M u l t i p l y window ’ s r e s u l t
13 / / i n t o t h e o v e r a l l r e s u l t
14 BN mod mul ( r , r , c t [ wval ] ,m) ;
15 }
Figure 2.3: Fixed-window implementation of large-number modular exponentiation
of the exponent. Note that the window value (which consists of the bits from the secret
exponent) directly determines which elements of ct are accessed. These elements are
each a large integers, each of which is typically stored as an array or ordinary integers (e.g.
OpenSSL’s “Big Number” BN structure). Since each such array is much larger than a cache
block, different large integers occupy distinct cache blocks, and thus the address the cache
set that is accessed when reading the elements of the ct array reveals key material. Perci-
val’s attack [44], for example, can note the sequence in which the cache sets are accessed
by the victim during fixed-window exponentiation, which reveals which window values
were used and in what sequence, which in turns yields the bits of the secret exponent. To
mitigate such attacks, the implementation in OpenSSL has been changed to store ct such
that each of the cache blocks it contains parts from a number of ct elements, and therefore
the sequence of memory blocks that are accessed in each ct[wval] lookup leak none or
very few bits of that lookup’s wval.
Another broad class of side channel attacks relies on choosing the ciphertext such that
the side-channel behavior of the modular multiplication reveals which of the possible mul-
tiplicands is being used. For example, Genkin et al. [11, 19] construct a ciphertext that
produces many zero limbs in any value produced by multiplication with the ciphertext,
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but when squaring such a many-zero-limbed value the result has fewer zero limbs, re-
sulting in an easily-distinguishable side channel signals whenever a squaring operation
(BN mod mul(r,r,r,m) in our examples) immediately follows a 1-valued window (i.e.
when r is equal to rprev ∗ c mod m). This approach has been extended [4] to construct a
(chosen) ciphertext that reveals when a particular window value is used in multiplication in
a windowed implementation, allowing full recovery of the exponent by collecting signals
that correspond to 2w chosen ciphertexts (one for each window value). However, chosen-
ciphertext attacks can be prevented in the current implementation of OpenSSL by enabling
blinding, which combines the ciphertext with an encrypted (using the public key) random
“ciphertext”, performs secret-exponent modular exponentiation on this blinded version of
the ciphertext, and then “unblinding” the decrypted result.
Overall, because large-integer multiplication is where large-integer exponentiation spends
most of its time, most of the side-channel measurements (e.g. signal samples for physical
side channels) also correspond to this multiplication activity and thus both attacks and mit-
igation tend to focus on that part of the signal, leaving the (comparably brief) parts of the
signal in-between the multiplications largely unexploited by attacks but also unprotected
by countermeasures. The next section describes our new attack approach that targets the
signal that corresponds to computing the value of the window, i.e .the signal between the
multiplications.
2.4 Proposed Attack Method
In both fixed- and sliding-window implementations, our attack approach focuses on the
relatively brief periods of computation that considers each bit of the exponent and forms
the window valuewval. The attack approach has three key components that we will discuss
as follows. First, Section 2.4.1 describes how the signal is received and pre-processed.
Second, Section 2.4.2 describes how we identify the point in the signal’s timeline where
each interval of interest begins. Finally, we describe how the bits of the secret exponent are
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recovered from these signal snippets for fixed-window (Section 2.4.3) and sliding-window
(Section 2.4.4) implementations.
2.4.1 Receiving the Signal
The computation we target is brief and the different values of exponent bits produce rel-
atively small variation in the side-channel signal, so the signals subjected to our analysis
need to have sufficient bandwidth and signal-to-noise ratio for our analysis to succeed. To
maximize the signal-to-noise ratio while minimizing intrusion, we position EM probes just
outside the targeted device’s enclosure. We then run RSA decryption in OpenSSL on the
target device while recording the signal in a 40 MHz band around the clock frequency. The
40 MHz bandwidth was chosen as a compromise between recovery rate for the bits of the
secret exponent and the availability and cost of receivers capable of capturing the desired
bandwidth. Specifically, the 40 MHz bandwidth is well within the capabilities of Ettus
USRP B200-mini receiver, which is very compact, costs less than $1,000, and can receive
up to 56 MHz of bandwidth around a center frequency that can be set between 70 MHz and
6 GHz, and yet the 40 MHz bandwidth is sufficient to recover nearly all bits of the secret
exponent from a single instance of exponentiation that uses that exponent.
We then apply AM demodulation to the received signal, and finally upsample it by a
factor of 4. The upsampling consists of interpolating through the signal’s existing sample
points and placing additional points along the interpolated curve. This is needed because
our receiver’s sampling is not synchronized in any way to the computation of interest, so
two signal snippets collected for the same computation may be misaligned by up to half of
the sample period. Upsampling allows us to re-align these signals with higher precision,
and we found that 4-fold upsampling yields sufficient precision for our purposes.
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Figure 2.4: Signal that includes the end of one Montgomery multiplication, then the part
relevant to our analysis, and then the beginning of another Montgomery multiplication.
The horizontal axis is time (from left to right) and the vertical axis is the magnitude of the
AM-demodulated signal.
2.4.2 Identifying Relevant Parts of the Signal
Figure 2.4 shows a brief portion of the signal that begins during fixed-window exponen-
tiation in OpenSSL. It includes part of one large-number multiplication (Line 7 in Fig-
ure 2.3), which in OpenSSL uses the Montgomery algorithm and a constant-time imple-
mentation designed to avoid multiplicand-dependent timing variation that was exploited
by prior side-channel attacks. The point in time where Montgomery multiplication returns
and the relevant part of the signal begins is indicated by a dashed vertical line in Figure 2.4.
In this particular portion of the signal, the execution proceeds to lines 8 and 9 Figure 2.2,
where a bit of the exponent is obtained and added to wval, then lines 10 and 6, and then
7 where, at the point indicated by the second dashed vertical line, it enters another Mont-
gomery multiplication, whose signal continues well past the right edge of Figure 2.4. As
indicated in the figure, the relevant part of the signal is very brief relative to the duration of
the Montgomery multiplication.
A naive approach to identifying the relevant snippets in the overall signal would be to
obtain reference signal snippets during training and then, during the attack, match against
these reference snippets at each position in the signal and use the best-matching parts of
the signal. Such signal matching works best when looking for a snippet that has prominent
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features, so they are unlikely to be obscured by the noise, and whose prominent features
occur in a pattern which is unlikely to exist elsewhere in the signal. Unfortunately, the
signal snippets relevant for our analysis have little signal variation (relative to other parts
of the signal) and a signal shape (just a few up-and-downs) that many other parts of the
signal resemble. In contrast, the signal that corresponds to the Montgomery multiplication
has stronger features, and they occur in a very distinct pattern.
Therefore, instead of finding instances of relevant snippets by matching them against
their reference signals from training, we use as a reference the signal that corresponds to the
most prominent change in the signal during Montgomery multiplication, where the signal
abruptly changes from a period with a relatively low signal level to a period with a rela-
tively high signal level. We identify this point in the signal using a very efficient algorithm.
We first compute the signal’s moving median (thick dashed black curve in Figure 2.4) to
improve resilience to noise. We then examine the derivative (slope) of this moving median
(thick red curve in Figure 2.4) to identify peaks that significantly exceed its statistically
expected variation. In Figure2.4 the thick red arrow indicates such a peak, which corre-
sponds to the most prominent change in the Montgomery multiplication that precedes the
relevant part of the signal. Because the implementation of the Montgomery multiplication
was designed to have almost no timing variation, the signal snippet we actually need for
analysis is at a fixed time offset from the point of this match.
Because this method of identifying the relevant snippets of the signal is based on the sig-
nal that corresponds to the Montgomery multiplication that precedes each relevant snippet,
the same method can be used for extracting relevant signal snippets for both fixed-window
and sliding-window exponentiation – in both cases the relevant snippet is at the (same)
fixed offset from the point at which a prominent-enough peak is detected in the derivative
of the signal’s moving median.
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2.4.3 Recovering Exponent Bits in the Fixed-window Implementation
In the fixed-window implementation, large-number multiplication is used for squaring
(Line 7 in Figure 2.3) and for updating the result after each window (Line 14). Thus there
are four control-flow possibilities for activity between Montgomery multiplications.
The first two control flow possibilities begin when the Montgomery multiplication in
line 7 completes. Both control flow possibilities involve updating the window value to in-
clude another bit from the exponent (lines 8, 9, and 10), and at line 6 incrementing i and
checking it against w, the maximum size of the window. The first control flow possibility is
the more common one - the window does not end and the execution proceeds to line 7 when
another multiplication at line 7. We label this control flow possibility S-S (from a squaring
to a squaring). The second control flow possibility occurs after the last bit of the window is
examined and added to wval, and in that case the loop at line 6 is exited, the parameters for
the result update at line 14 are prepared, and the Montgomery multiplication at line 14 be-
gins. The parameter preparation in our code example would involve computing the address
of ct[wval] to create a pointer that would be passed to the Montgomery multiplication as
its second multiplicand. In OpenSSL’s implementation the ct is kept in a scattered format
to minimize leakage of wval through the cache side channel while computing the Mont-
gomery multiplication, so instead the value of wval is used to gather the scattered parts of
ct[wval] into a pre-allocated array that is passed to Montgomery multiplication. Since this
pre-allocated array is used for all result-update multiplications, memory and cache behav-
ior during the Montgomery multiplication no longer depend on wval. This means that in
this second control-flow possibility involves significant activity to gather the parts of the
multiplicand and place them into the pre-allocated array, and only then the Montgomery
multiplication at line 14 begins. We label this control flow possibility S-U (from a squaring
to an update).
The last two control flow possibilities occur after the result update in line 14 completes
its Montgomery multiplication. The loop condition at line 2 is checked, and then one con-
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trol flow possibility (third of the four) is that the entire exponentiation loop exits. We label
this control flow possibility U-X (from an update to an exit). The last control-flow possi-
bility, which occurs for all windows except the last one, is that after line 2 we execute line
3, enter the window-scanning loop at line 6, and begin the next large-number Montgomery
multiplication at line 7. We label this control flow possibility U-S (from an update to a
squaring).
The sequence in which these four control flow possibilities are encountered in each
window is always the same: w − 1 occurrences of S-S, then one occurrence of S-U, then
either U-S or U-X, where U-X is only possible for the last window of the exponent.
The first part of our analysis involves distinguishing among these four control flow pos-
sibilities. The reason for doing so is that noise bursts, interrupts, and activity on other cores
can temporarily interfere with our signal and prevent detection of Montgomery multipli-
cation. In such cases, sole reliance on the known sequence of control flow possibilities
would cause a “slip” between the observed sequence and the expected one, causing us to
use incorrect reference signals to recover bits of the exponent and to put the recovered bits
at incorrect positions within the recovered exponent.
The classification into the four possibilities is much more reliable than recovery of
exponent’s bits. Compared to the other three possibilities, S-U spends significantly more
time between Montgomery multiplications (because of the multiplicand-gathering activity),
so it can be recognized with high accuracy and we use it to confirm that the exponentiation
has just completed a window. The U-X possibility is also highly recognizable because,
instead of executing Montgomery multiplication after it, it leads to executing code that
converts from Montgomery to standard large-number format, and it serves to confirm that
the entire exponentiation has ended. The S-S and U-S snippets both involve only a few
instructions between Montgomery multiplications so they are harder to tell apart, but our
signal matching still has a very high accuracy in distinguishing between them.
After individual snippets are matched to the four possibilities, that matching is used
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to find the most likely mapping of the sequence of snippets onto the known valid se-
quence. For example, if for w = 5 we observe S-U, U-S, S-S, S-S, S-S, S-U, all with
high-confidence matches, we know that one S-S is missing for that window. We then ad-
ditionally use timing between these snippets to determine the position of the missing S-S.
Even if that determination is erroneous, we will correctly begin the matching for the next
window after the S-U, so a missing snippet is unlikely to cause any slips, but even when
it does cause a slip, such a slip is very likely to be “contained” within one exponentiation
window. Note that a missing S-U or S-S snippet prevents our attack from using its signal
matching to recover the value of the corresponding bit. A naive solution would be to assign
a random value to that bit (with a 50% error rate among missing bits). However, for full
RSA key recovery missing bits (erasures, i.e. the value of the bit is known to be unknown)
are much less problematic than errors (the value of the bit is incorrect but not known a
priori to be incorrect), we label these missing bits as erasures.
Finally, for S-S and S-U snippets we perform additional analysis to recover the bit of
the exponent that snippet corresponds to. Recall that, in both S-S and S-U control flow
possibilities, in line 9 a new bit is read from the exponent and is added to wval, and that bit
is the one we will recover from the snippet. For ease of discussion, we will refer to the value
of this bit as bval. To recover bval, in training we obtain examples of these snippets for each
value of bval. To suppress the noise in our reference snippets and thus make later matching
more accurate, these reference snippets are averages of many “identical” examples from
training. Clearly, there should be separate references for bval = 0 (where only bval = 0
examples are averaged) and for bval = 1 (where only bval = 1 examples are averaged.
However, bval is not the only value that affects the signal in a systematic way – the signal
in this part of the computation is also affected by previous value ofwval, loop counter i, etc.
The problem is that these variations occur in the same part of the signal where variations
due to bval occur, so averaging of these different variants may result in attenuating the
impact of bval. We alleviate this problem by forming separate references for different bit-
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positions within the window, e.g. for window size w = 5 each value of bval would have
4 sets of S-S snippets and one set of S-U snippets, because the first for bits in the window
correspond to S-S snippets and the last bit in the window to an S-U snippet. To account for
other value-dependent in the signal, in each such set of snippets we cluster similar signals
together and use the centroid of each cluster as the reference signal. We use the K-Means
clustering algorithm and the distance metric used for clustering is Euclidean distance (sum
of squared differences among same-position samples in the two snippets). We found that
having at least 6-10 clusters for each set of snippets discussed above improves accuracy
significantly. Beyond 6-10 clusters our recovery of secret exponent’s bits improves only
slightly but requires more training examples to compensate for having fewer examples per
cluster (and thus less noise suppression in the cluster’s centroid). Thus we use 10 clusters
for each window-bit-position for each of the two possible values of bval. Overall, the
number of S-S reference snippets for bval recovery is 2 ∗ (w − 1) ∗ 10 – two possible
values of bval, w − 1 bit-positions, 10 reference signals (cluster centroids) for each, while
for S-U snippets we only have 20 reference snippets because S-U only happens for the last
bit-position in the window. For commonly used window sizes this results in a relatively
small overall number of reference snippets, e.g. for w = 5 there are only 100 reference
snippets. To illustrate the difference in the signals created by the value of the exponent’s
bit, Figure 2.5 shows two reference S-S snippets (cluster centroids) for each value of the
exponent’s bit, with the most significant differences between 0-value and 1-value signals
indicated by thick arrows.
Recall that, before attempting recovery of an unknown bit of the secret exponent, we
have already identified which control-flow possibility (S-S or S-U) the snippet under con-
sideration belongs to, and for S-S which bit-position it belongs to, so there are 20 reference
snippets that each snippet-under-consideration is compared to (10 clusters for bval = 0 and
10 clusters for bval = 1). Thus the final step of our analysis involves finding the closest







Figure 2.5: Example signal references (cluster centroid) for S-S snippets. Two references
are shown for each value of the exponent’s bit that corresponds to the snippet.
the bval associated with that reference snippet.
2.4.4 Recovering Exponent Bits in the Sliding-window Implementation
The sliding-window implementation of large-integer exponentiation (Figure 2.2) has three
sites where Montgomery multiplication is called: the squaring within a window at line 26,
which we label S, the update of the result at line 29, which we label U , and the squaring for
a zero-valued window at line 7, which we label Z. The control flow possibilities between
these include going from a squaring to another squaring (which we label as S-S). This
transition is very brief (it only involves staying in the loop at line 25). The other transitions
are S-U, which consumes more time because it performs the ct[wval] computation; U-Z,
which involves executing line 31, line 3, line 4 (where a bit of the exponent is examined),
and finally entering Montgomery multiplication at line 7; U-S, which involves executing
line 31, line 3, line 4, lines 11 and 12, and the entire window-scanning loop at lines 14-23,
then line 25 and finally entering Montgomery multiplication at line 26; Z-Z where after line
7 the execution proceeds to line 8, line 9, line 3, line 4, and line 7 again; Z-S where after
line 7 the execution proceeds to lines 8, 9, 3, 4, and then to lines 11 and 12, the loop at line
14-23, then line 25 and finally line 26; U-X where after the Montgomery multiplication at
line 29 the execution proceeds to line 31 and then exits the loop at line 3; and finally S-X,
where after Montgomery multiplication at line 7 the execution proceeds to lines 8 and 9
and then exits the loop at line 3.
29
Just like in fixed-window implementations, our recovery of the secret exponent begins
with determining which snippet belongs to which of these control-flow possibilities. While
in Section 2.4.3 this was needed only to correct for missing snippets, in the sliding-window
implementation the window size varies depending on which bit-values are encountered in
the exponent, so distinguishing among the control-flow possibilities is crucial for correctly
assigning recovered bits to bit-positions in the exponent even if no snippets are missing.
Furthermore, many of the exponent’s bits can be recovered purely based on the sequence
of these control-flow possibilities.
Our overall approach for distinguishing among control flow possibilities is similar to
that in Section 2.4.3, except that here there are more control-flow possibilities, and the U-S
and Z-S coarse-grained possibilities each have multiple control flow possibilities within
the snippet: for each bit considered for the window, line 19 determines whether or not to
execute lines 20 and 21. However, at the point in the sequence where U-S can occur, the
only alternative is U-Z, which is much shorter and thus they are easy to tell apart. Similarly,
the only alternative to Z-S is the much shorter Z-Z, so they are also easy to tell apart.
By classifying snippets according to which control-flow possibility they belong (where
U-S and U-Z are each treated as one possibility), and by knowing the rules the sequence of
these must follow, we can recover from missing snippets and, more importantly, use rules
similar to those in [42] to recover many of the bits in the secret exponent. However, in
contrast to work in [42] that could only distinguish between a squaring (line 7 or line 26, i.e.
S or Z in our sequence notation) and an update (line 29, U in our sequence notation) using
memory access patterns within each Montgomery multiplication (which implements both
squaring and updates), our method uses the signal snippets between these Montgomery
multiplications to recover more detailed information, e.g., for each squaring our recovered
sequence indicates whether it is an S or a Z, and this simplifies the rules for recovery of
exponent’s bits and allows us to extract more of them. Specifically, after a U-S or Z-S,
which compute the window value wval, the number of bits in the window can be obtained
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by counting the S-S occurrences that follow before an S-U is encountered. For example,
consider the sequence U-S, S-S, S-S, S-U, U-Z, Z-Z, Z-Z, Z-S. The first U-S indicates that a
new window has been identified and a squaring for one of its bits is executed. Then the two
occurrences of S-S indicate two additional squaring for this window, and S-U indicates that
only these three squaring are executed, so the window has only 3 bits. Because the window
begins and ends with 1-valued bits, it is trivial to deduce the values of two of these 3 bits.
If we also know that wmax = 5, the fact that the window only has 3 bits indicates that the
two bits after this window are both 0-valued (because a 1-valued bit would have expanded
the window to include it). Then, after S-U, we observe U-Z, which indicates that the bit
after the window is 0-valued (which we have already deduced), then two occurrences of Z-
Z indicate two more 0-valued bits (one of which we have already deduced), and finally Z-S
indicates that a new non-zero window begins, i.e. the next bit is 1. Overall, out of the seven
bits examined during this sequence, six were recovered solely based on the sequence. Note
that two of the bits (the two zeroes after the window) were redundantly recovered, and
this redundancy helps us correct mistakes such as missing snippets or miss-categorized
snippets.
In general, this sequence-based analysis recovers all zeroes between windows and two
bits from each window. In our experiments, when using wmax = 5 this analysis alone on
average recovers 68% of the secret exponent’s bits, and with using wmax = 6, another
commonly used value for wmax, this analysis alone on average recovers 55% of the expo-
nent’s bits. These recovery rates are somewhat higher than what square-update sequences
alone enable [42], but recall that in our approach sequence recovery is only the preparation
for our analysis of exponent-bit-dependent variation within individual signal snippets.
Since the only bits not already recovered are the “inner” (not the first and not the last)
bits of each window, and since U-S and Z-S snippets are the only ones that examine these
inner bits, our further analysis only focuses on these. To simplify discussion, we will use
U-S to describe our analysis because the analysis for Z-S snippets is virtually identical.
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Unlike fixed-window implementations, where the bits of the exponent are individually
examined in separate snippets, in sliding-window implementations a single U-S or Z-S
snippet contains the activity (line 4) for examining the first bit of the window and the ex-
ecution of the entire loop (lines 14-23) that constructs the wval by examining the next
wmax − 1. Since these bits are examined in rapid succession without intervening highly-
recognizable Montgomery multiplication activity, it would be difficult to further divide the
snippet’s signal into pieces that each correspond to consideration of only one bit. Instead,
we note that wmax is relatively small (typically 5 or 6), and that there are only 2wmax pos-
sibilities for the control flow and most of the operands in the entire window-scanning loop.
Therefore, in training we form separate reference snippets for each of these possibilities,
and then during the attack we compare the signal snippet under consideration to each of the
references, identify the best-matching reference snippet (smallest Euclidean distance), and
use the bits that correspond to that reference as the recovered bit values.
2.4.5 Full Recovery of RSA Private Key Using Recovered Exponent Bits
Our RSA key recovery algorithm is a variant of the algorithm described by Henecka et
al. [49], which is based on Heninger and Shacham’s branch-and-prune algorithm [47]. Like
Bernstein et al. [42], we recover from the side channel signal only the bits of the private
exponents dp and dq, and the recovery of the full private key relies on exploiting the numer-
ical relationships (Equations (1) in Bernstein et al. [42]) between these private exponents
(dp and dq), the public modulus N and exponent e, and p and q, the private factors of N :
edp = 1 + kp(p− 1)mod 2i
edq = 1 + kq(q − 1)mod 2i
pq = N mod 2i
where kp and kq are positive integers smaller than the public exponent e and satisfy (kp −
1)(kq−1) ≡ kpkqN mod e. The public exponent practically never exceeds 32 bits [47] and
in most cases e = 65537, so a key recovery algorithm needs to try at most e pairs of kp, kq.
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We could not simply apply Bernstein’s algorithm [42] to the exponents recovered by
our signal analysis because, like the original branch-and-prune algorithm, such recovery
requires certain knowledge of the bit values at some fraction of bit-positions in dp and dq,
while the remaining bits are unknown but known to be unknown, i.e. they are erasures
rather than errors. Such branch-and-prune search has been shown to be efficient when up
to 50% of the bit-positions (chosen uniformly at random) in dp and dq are erasures, while
its running time grows exponentially when the erasures significantly exceed 50% of the bit
positions.
Henecka’s algorithm [49] can be applied with the above pruning equations to recover
the private key when some of the bits are in error. However, its pruning is based on a
key assumption that errors are uniformly distributed, and it does not explicitly consider
erasures. Recall, however, that for some of the bit positions our analysis cannot identify
the relevant signal snippet for matching against training signals (see Section 2.4.2), which
results in an erasure. A naive approach for handling erasures would be to randomly assign
a bit value for each erasure (resulting in a 50% error rate among erasures) and then apply
Henecka’s algorithm. Unfortunately, the erasures during our recovery are a product of
disturbances in the signal that are very large in magnitude, and such a disturbance also
tends to last long enough to affect multiple bits. With random values assigned to erasures,
this produces 50%-error-rate bursts that are highly unlikely to be produced by uniformly
distributed errors, causing Henecka’s algorithm to either prune the correct partial candidate
key or become inefficient (depending on the choice of the ε parameter).
Instead, we modify Henecka’s algorithm to handle erasures by branching at a bit posi-
tion when it encounters an erasure, but ignoring that bit position for the purposes of making
a pruning decision. We further extend Henecka’s algorithm to not do a “hard” pruning of
a candidate key when its error count is too high. Instead, we save such a candidate key so
that, if no candidate keys remain but the search for the correct private key is not completed,
we can “un-prune” the lowest-error-count candidate keys that were previously pruned due
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to having too high of an error count. This is similar to adjusting the value of ε in Henecka’s
algorithm and retrying, except that the work of previous tries is not repeated, and this low
cost of relaxing the error tolerance allows us to start with a low error tolerance (large ε in
Henecka et al.) and adjust it gradually until the solution is found.
We further modify Henecka’s algorithm to, rather than expand a partial key by multiple
bits (parameter t in Henecka et al.) at a time, expand by one bit at a time and, among the
newly created partial keys, only further expand the lowest-recent error-count ones until the
desired expansion count (t) is reached. In Henecka’s algorithm, full expansion by t bits at
a time creates 2t new candidate keys, while our approach discovers the same set of t-times-
expanded non-pruned candidates without performing all t expansions on those candidates
that encounter too many errors even after fewer than t single-bit expansions. For a constant
t, this reduces the number of partial keys that are examined by a constant factor, but when
the actual error rate is low this constant factor is close to 2t.
Overall, our actual implementation of this modified algorithm is very efficient - it con-
siders (expands by one bit) about 300,000 partial keys per second using a single core on
recent mobile hardware (4th generation Surface Pro with a Core i7 processor), and for low
actual error rates typically finds a solution after only a few thousand partial keys are con-
sidered. We evaluate its ability to reconstruct private RSA keys using dp and dq bits that
contain errors and/or erasures by taking 1,000 RSA keys, introducing random errors, ran-
dom erasures, and a half-and-half mix of errors and erasures, at different error/erasure rates,
and counting how many partial keys had to be considered (expanded by a bit) before the
correct private key was reconstructed. The median number of steps for each error/erasure
rate is shown in Figure 2.6. We only show results for error/erasure rates up to 10% because
those are the most relevant to our actual signal-based recovery of the exponent’s bits.
We observe that our implementation of reconstruction quickly becomes inefficient when
only errors are present and the error rate approaches 7%, which agrees with the theoretical










Figure 2.6: Single-bit expansion steps needed to reconstruct the private RSA key (vertical

















Figure 2.7: Percentage of keys recovered in fewer than 5,000,000 single-bit expansion
steps (vertical axis) as a function of the rate at which errors and/or erasures are injected
(horizontal axis).
and the upper bound for efficient reconstruction is at 8.4% error rate. In contrast, when
only erasures are present, our implementation of reconstruction remains very efficient even
as the erasure rate exceeds 10%, which agrees with Bernstein et al.’s finding that recon-
struction should be efficient with up to 50% erasure rates. Finally, when equal numbers
of errors and erasures are injected, the efficiency for each injection rate is close to (only
slightly worse than) the efficiency for error-only injection at half that rate, i.e. with a mix
of errors and erasures, the efficiency of reconstruction is largely governed by the errors.
Figure 2.7 shows the percentage of experiments in which the correct RSA key was
recovered in fewer than 5,000,000 steps (about 17 seconds on the Surface 4 tablet). When
only errors are present, < 90% of the reconstructions take fewer than 5,000,000 steps
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until the error rate exceeds 5.4%, at which point the percentage of under-five-million-steps
reconstructions rapidly declines and drops below 10% at the 7.9% error rate. In contrast,
all erasure-only reconstructions are under 5,000,000 steps even at the 10% erasure rate.
Finally, when erasures and errors are both present in equal measure, the percentage of
under-5,000,000-step reconstructions remains above 90% until the injection rate reaches
9.8% (4.9% of the bits are in error and another 4.9% are erased).
2.5 Evaluation
In this section we describe our measurement setup and obtained results for recovering keys
from blinded RSA encryption runs on three different devices.
2.5.1 Experimental Setup
Figure 2.8: The measurement setup for each of the three devices (shown in the right-to-left
order): Samsung Galaxy Centura SCH-S738C smart phone, Alcatel Ideal smart phone, and
the A13-OLinuXino board.
We run the OpenSSL RSA application on Android smart phones Samsung Galaxy Cen-
tura SCH-S738C [50] and Alcatel Ideal [51], and on an embedded device (A13-OLinuXino
board [52])) . The Alcatel Ideal cellphone has quad-core 1.1 GHz Qualcomm Snapdragon
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processor with Android OS(version 6) and the Samsung phone has a single-core 800 MHz
Qualcomm MSM7625A Chipset with Android OS(version 5). The A13- OLinuXino board
is a single-board computer that has an in order, 2-issue Cortex A8 ARM processor [53] and
runs Debian Linux operating system.
In our experimental setup, we receive signals using small magnetic probe. We place
the probe close to the monitored system as shown in Figure 2.8. The signals collected by
the probe are recorded with Keysight N9020A MXA spectrum analyzer [54]. Our deci-
sion to use spectrum analyzer was mainly driven by its existing features such as built-in
support for automating measurements, saving and analyzing measured results, visualizing
the signals when debugging code, etc. We have observed very similar signals when us-
ing less expensive equipment such as Ettus USRP B200-mini receiver [55]. The analysis
was implemented in MATLAB and on a personal computer runs in under one minute per
decryption instance (i.e. per recovered 1024-bit exponent).
2.5.2 Experimental Results
2.5.3 Results for OpenSSL’s Constant-Time Fixed-Window Implementation
Our first set of experiments evaluates the attack’s ability to recover bits of the 1024-bit
secret exponent dp used during RSA-2048 decryption. OpenSSL uses a fixed window
size w = 5 for exponentiation of this size. Note that RSA decryption involves another
exponentiation, with dq, and uses the Chinese Remainder Theorem to combine their results.
However, the two exponentiations use exactly the same code and dp and dq are of the same
size, so results for recovering dq are statistically the same to those shown here for recovering
dp.
For each device, our training uses signals that correspond to 15 decryption instances,
one for each of 15 randomly generated but known keys, and with ciphertext that is randomly
generated for decryption. Note that these 15 decryptions provide around 12 thousand ex-
amples of S-S signal snippets, 3 thousand S-U, 3 thousand U-S, and 15 U-X snippets. This
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is more than enough examples of each control flow possibility to distinguish between these
control flow possibilities accurately. More importantly, this provides on average 1,500 snip-
pet examples for each of the 100 (2 ∗ 5 ∗ w) clusters whose centroids are used as reference
snippets when recovering the bits of the unknown secret exponents. Note that using larger
RSA keys proportionally increases the number of snippets produced by each decryption,
while w changes little or not at all. Thus for larger RSA keys we expect that even fewer
decryptions would be needed for training.
After training we perform the actual attack. We randomly generate 135 RSA-2048
keys, and for each of these keys we record, demodulate, and upsample (see Section 2.4.1)
the signal that corresponds to only one decryption with that key, using a ciphertext that
is randomly generated for each decryption. Next, the signal that corresponds to each de-
cryption is processed to extract the relevant snippets from it (see Section 2.4.2). Then, as
described in Section 2.4.3, each of these snippets is matched against reference snippets
(from training) to identify which of the control-flow possibilities each snippet belongs to
and, for S-S and S-U snippets, which bit-position in the exponent (and the window) the
snippet corresponds to. Finally, S-S and S-U snippets are matched against the 20 clusters
that correspond to its position in the window to recover the value of the bit at that position
in the secret exponent.
The metric we use for the success of this attack is the success rate for recovery of
exponent’s bits, i.e. the fraction of the exponent’s bits for which the recovery produces
the value that the secret exponent at that position actually had. To compute this success
rate, we compare the recovered exponents to the actual exponents dp and dq that were used,
counting the bit positions at which the two agree and, at the end, dividing that count with
the total number of bits in the two exponents.
The maximum, median, and minimum success rate for each of the three targeted de-
vices is shown in Figure 2.9. We observe that the success rate of the attack is extremely

















Figure 2.9: Success rate for recovery of secret exponent dp’s bits during only one instance
of RSA-2048 decryption that uses that exponent. For each device, the maximum, median,
and minimum success rate among decryption instances (each with a different randomly
generated key) is shown.
bits. For the OLinuXino board, most decryption instances (>85% of them) had all bits of
the exponent recovered correctly, except for the most significant 4 bits. These 4 bits are
processed before entering the code in Figure 2.3 to leave a whole number of 5-bit windows
for that code, so we do not attempt to recover them and treat them as erasures. Among
the OLinuXino decryption instances that had any other reconstruction errors, nearly all had
only one additional incorrectly recovered bit (error, not erasure), and a few had two.
The results for the Samsung phone were slightly worse – in addition to the 4 most
significant bits, several decryption instances had one additional bit that was left unknown
(erasure) because of an interrupt that occurs between the derivative-of-moving-median peak
and the end of the snippet that follows it, which either obliterates the peak or prevents the
snippet from correctly being categorized according to its control flow. In addition to these
unknown (but known-to-be-unknown) bits, for the Samsung phone the reconstruction also
produced between 0 and 4 incorrectly recovered (error) bits.
Finally, for the Alcatel Ideal phone most instances of the encryption had between 13
and 16 unknown bits in each of the two exponents, mostly because activity on the other
three cores interferes with the activity on the core doing the RSA decryption), and a similar
number of incorrectly recovered bits (errors).













Figure 2.10: Success rate for recovery of secret exponent dp’s bits during only one instance
of RSA-2048 decryption that uses that exponent, when training on OLinuXino board #1
and then using that training data for unknown exponent recovery on the same board and
on seven other boards. For each device, the maximum, median, and minimum success rate
among decryption instances (each with a different randomly generated key) is shown.
one device and then recovering exponent bits using signals obtained from another device
of the same kind, we use eight OLinuXino boards1, which we label #1 through #8. Our
training uses signals obtained only from board #1, and then the unknown keys are used on
each of the eight boards and subjected to analysis using the same training data (from board
#1). The results of this experiment are shown in Figure 2.10, where the leftmost data points
correspond to training and recovery on the same device, while the remaining seven sets of
data points correspond to training on one board and recovery on another.
These results indicate that training on a different device of the same kind does not
substantially affect the accuracy of recovery.
Finally, for each RSA decryption instance, the recovered exponent bits, using both the
recovered dp and the recovered dq, were supplied to our implementation of the full-key
reconstruction algorithm. For each instance, the correct full RSA private key was recon-
structed within one second on the Core i7-based Surface Pro 4 tablet, including the time
needed to find the kp and kq coefficients that were not known a priori. This is an expected
result, given that even the worst bit recovery rates (for the Alcatel phone) correspond to a an
error rate of about 1.5%, combined with an erasure rate of typically 1.5% but sometimes as













Figure 2.11: Success rate for recovery of secret exponent dp’s bits during only one instance
of RSA-2048 decryption that uses that exponent for sliding-window exponentiation. The
maximum, median, and minimum success rate among decryption instances (each with a
different randomly generated key) is shown for recovery that only uses the snippet-type
sequence (S-M-Z Sequence), and for recovery that also recovers window bits from U-S
and Z-S snippets (Overall).
high as 3% (depending on how much system activity occurs while RSA encryption is exe-
cution on the phone), which is well withing the range for which our full-key reconstruction
is extremely efficient.
2.5.4 Results for the Sliding-Window Implementation
To improve our understanding of the implications for this new attack approach, we also
apply it to RSA-2048 whose implementation uses OpenSSL’s sliding-window exponentia-
tion – recall that this was the default implementation used in OpenSSL until it switched
to a fixed-window implementation in response to attacks that exploit sliding-window’s
exponent-dependent square-multiply sequence.
In these experiments we use 160 MHz of bandwidth and target the OLinuXino board.
Recall that in a sliding-window implementation our method can categorize the snippets
according to their beginning/ending point to recover the sequence of zero-squaring (Z),
window-squaring (S), and result update (M) occurrences. The fraction of the exponent’s
bits recovered by this sequence reconstruction (shown as “S-M-Z Sequence” in Figure 2.11)
is in our experiments between 51.2% and 57.7% with a median of 54.5%. This sequence-
based recovery has produces no errors in most cases (keys), and among the few encryptions
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that had any errors, none had more than one.
In our attack approach, after this sequence-based reconstruction, the U-S and Z-S snip-
pets are subjected to further analysis to recover the remaining bits of the window computed
in each U-S and Z-S snippet. At the end of this analysis, the fraction of the exponent’s bits
that are correctly recovered (“Overall” in Figure 2.11) is between 97.7% and 99.6%, with
a median of 98.7%.
This rate of recovery for exponent bits provides for very rapid reconstruction of the full
RSA key. However, we note that it is somewhat inferior to our results on fixed-window
exponentiation on the same device (OLinuXino board), in spite of using more bandwidth
for attacks on sliding-window (160MHz bandwidth) than on fixed-window (40MHz band-
width) implementation. The primary reason for this is that in the fixed-window imple-
mentation each analyzed snippet corresponds to examining only one bit of the exponent,
whereas in the sliding-window implementation wmax = 6 bits of the exponent are exam-
ined in a single U-S or Z-S snippet, while the exponent-dependent variation in the snippet
is not much larger. Since sliding-window recovery tries to extract several times more in-
formation from about the same amount of signal change, its recovery is more affected by
noise and thus slightly less accurate.
2.6 Mitigation
We focus our mitigation efforts on the fixed-window implementation, which is the imple-
mentation of choice in the current version of OpenSSL, and which already mitigates the
problem of exponent-dependent square-multiply sequences and timing variation. We iden-
tify three key enablers for this attack approach, which roughly correspond to discussion in
Sections 2.4.1, 2.4.2, and 2.4.3. Successful mitigation requires removing at least one of
these enablers, so we now discuss each of the attack enablers along with potential mitiga-
tion approaches focused on that enabler.
The first enabler of the specific attack demonstrated in this chapter is the existence
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of computational-activity-modulated EM signals around the processor’s clock frequency,
and the attacker’s ability to obtain these signals with sufficient bandwidth and signal-to-
noise ratio. Potential mitigation thus include circuit-level approaches that reduce the effect
the differences in computation have the signal, additional shielding that attenuates these
signals to reduce their signal-to-noise ratio outside the device, deliberate creation of RF
noise and/or interference that also reduces the signal-to-noise ratio, etc. We do not focus
on these mitigation because all of them increase the device’s overall cost, weight, and/or
power consumption, all of them are difficult to apply to devices that are already in use,
and all of them may not provide protection against attacks that use this attack approach but
through a different physical side channel (e.g. power).
The second enabler of our attack approach is the attacker’s ability to precisely locate,
in the overall signal during an exponentiation operation, those brief snippets of signal that
correspond to examining the bits of the exponent and constructing the value of the window.
A simple mitigation approach would thus insert random additional amounts of computation
before, during, and/or after window computation. However, additional computation that
has significant variation in duration would also have a significant mean of that duration,
i.e. it would slow down the window computation. Furthermore, it is possible (and indeed
likely) that our attack can be adapted to identify and ignore the signal that corresponds to
this additional activity.
The final (third) enabler of our attack approach is the attacker’s ability to distinguish
between the signals whose computation has the same control flow but uses different val-
ues for a bit in the exponent. In this regard, the attack benefits significantly from 1) the
limited space of possibilities for value returned by BN is bit set – there are only two
possibilities: 0 or 1, and from 2) the fact that the computation that considers each such bit
is surrounded by computation that operates on highly predictable values – this causes any
signal variation caused by the return value of BN is bit set to stand out in a signal that
otherwise exhibits very little variation.
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Based on these observations, our mitigation relies on obtaining all the bits that belong to
one window at once, rather than extracting the bits one at a time. We accomplish this by us-
ing the bn get bits function (defined in bn exp.c in OpenSSL’s source code), which
uses shifts and masking to extract and return a BN ULONG-sized group of bits aligned
to the requested bit-position – in our case, the LSB of the window. The BN ULONG is
typically 32 or 64 bits in size, so there are billions of possibilities for the value it returns,
while the total execution time of bn get bits is only slightly more than the time that was
needed to append a single bit to the window (call to BN is bit set shifting the wval,
and or-ing to update wval with the new bit). For the attacker, this means that there are now
billions of possibilities for the value to be extracted from the signal, while the number of
signal samples available for this recovery is similar to what was originally used for making
a binary (single-bit) decision. Intuitively, the signal still contains the same amount of in-
formation as the signal from which one bit used to be recovered, but the attacker must now
















Figure 2.12: Success rate for recovery of secret exponent dp’s bits after the initial imple-
mentation of our window value randomization mitigation is applied.
This mitigation results in a slight improvement in execution time of the exponentiation
and, as shown in Figure 2.12, with the mitigation the recovery rate for the exponent’s bits
is no better than randomly guessing each bit (50% recovery rate). In fact, the recovery rate
with the mitigation is lower than 50% because, as in our pre-mitigation results, the bits
whose signal snippets could not be located are counted as incorrectly recovered. However,
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these bits can be treated as erasures, i.e. for each such bit the attacker knows that the value
of the bit is unknown, as opposed to a bits whose value is incorrect but the attacker has
no a-priori knowledge of that, so our recovery rate can be trivially improved by randomly
guessing (with 50% accuracy) the value of each erasure, rather than having 0% accuracy on
them. With this, the post-mitigation recovery rate indeed becomes centered around 50%,
i.e. equivalent to random guessing for all of the bits.
This mitigation has been submitted to OpenSSL and was merged into its master source
code branch on May 20th, prior to the publication of this chapter.
2.7 Conclusions
This chapter presents the first side channel attack approach that, without relying on the
cache organization and/or timing, retrieves the secret exponent from a single decryption on
arbitrary ciphertext in a modern (current version of OpenSSL) fixed-window constant-time
implementation of RSA. Specifically, the attack recovers the exponent’s bits during modu-
lar exponentiation from analog signals that are unintentionally produced by the processor
as it executes the constant-time code that constructs the value of each “window” in the ex-
ponent, rather than the signals that correspond to squaring/multiplication operations and/or
cache behavior during multiplicand table lookup operations. The approach is demonstrated
using electromagnetic (EM) emanations on two mobile phones and an embedded system,
and after only one decryption in a fixed-window RSA implementation it recovers enough
bits of the secret exponents to enable very efficient (within seconds) reconstruction of the
full private RSA key.
Since the value of the ciphertext is irrelevant to our attack, the attack succeeds even
when the ciphertext is unknown and/or when message randomization (blinding) is used.
Our evaluation uses signals obtained by demodulating the signal from a relatively narrow
band (40 MHz) around the processor’s clock frequency (around 1GHz), which is within the
capabilities of compact sub-$1,000 software-defined radio (SDR) receivers.
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CHAPTER 3
NONCE@ONCE: A SINGLE-TRACE EM SIDE CHANNEL ATTACK ON ECDSA
IN GNUPG/LIBGCRYPT AND OPENSSL
3.1 Abstract
This chapter presents the first side-channel attack that recovers the secret ephemeral scalar
(nonce) used in the elliptic curve point multiplication by a scalar in ECDSA, using the sig-
nal that corresponds to a single signing operation, in current versions of GnuPG/libgcrypt
and tt OpenSSL. Specifically, these ECDSA implementations use a conditional swap to
avoid creating control-flow and memory-access-pattern differences depending on the bits
of the nonce, because the knowledge of the nonce allows straightforward recovery of the
private key that was used in the ECDSA signing operation, and our attack uses the signal
differences created by systematic differences in operand values during a conditional swap
operation itself to recover each bit of the nonce.
Our experimental setup uses a custom-designed electric field probe (<$30) and a software-
defined radio (SDR) receiver (<$770) to collect the electromagnetic (EM) emanations cre-
ated by the victim device’s processor. We deploy the attack against two Android-based
mobile phones and against a Linux-based IoT development board, repeating the attack 100
times (each time with a different ECDSA key) on each device for each of the two target
cryptographic packages (libgcrypt and OpenSSL), and in each of these (hundreds of)
instances of ECDSA signing, the attack has successfully recovered the full ECDSA key
within seconds.
Finally, we propose a mitigation based on randomizing the exclusive-or mask in the
conditional swap operation, which avoids creating a systematic condition-dependent dif-
ference in operand values for exclusive-or operations during the conditional swap. We
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have confirmed that this mitigation is effective in preventing this and similar attacks, and
are currently working on submitting this mitigation to both GnuPG and OpenSSL, and
expect the mitigation to be merged into both source code repositories prior to publication
of this work.
3.2 Motivation
Physical side channel attacks exploit the physical side-effects of computation to extract
sensitive information, such as cryptographic keys, that is used during that computation.
The physical side-channel signals include electromagnetic emanations, which are created
by changes in the flows of current within the computational device [56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61],
variations in power consumption [26, 62, 63, 64], acoustic emanations [65, 30], and temper-
ature variation [66]. Most prior physical side-channel attacks exploit the large differences
in signals that are created when program execution takes different paths depending on a
condition that reveals information about the secret key. For example, some attacks exploit
the changes to the sequence of large-number square and multiply during modular
exponentiation in RSA [67, 68], ElGamal [69] and DSA [70] implementations. Analo-
gously, changes to the sequence of elliptic curve (EC) point double and add operations,
as well as other control flow that leaks information about the scalar during the EC point
multiplication by a scalar, has been exploited to attack prior implementations of EC-based
cryptographic algorithms [71, 72, 73, 74]. Other (non-physical) attacks on earlier imple-
mentations of ECDSA include exploiting secret-dependent differences in cache behavior
(memory access patterns) [75, 76, 77, 78]. Finally, in some attacks the message of the base
EC point is chosen by the attacker [79] in a way that produces values with distinguishable
signals in the EC point double and add operations during EC point-scalar multiplication.
To mitigate these side-channel attacks, in recent versions of cryptographic packages,
such as GnuPG/libgcrypt and OpenSSL, point and message blinding is applied prior
to performing point-scalar multiplication, to prevent chosen-message and chosen-base-
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point attacks. The point-scalar multiplication itself is implemented such that the execu-
tion time, control-flow, and memory access pattern, are all independent of the value of
the (secret) scalar. To produce the correct result without introducing timing, control-flow,
and access-pattern variation, these implementations rely on a conditional swap operation,
in two EC points are either swapped or not, depending on the value (0 or 1) of a swap
condition, using a sequence of bit-masking and exclusive-or operations whose sequence of
executed instruction, and sequence of accessed data addresses, remains the same regardless
of the value of the swap condition. This approach is needed to avoid leaking the value of
the swap condition, which has a direct relationship to the bits of the secret nonce, through
various side channels. Overall, the current implementations of point-scalar multiplication
used by ECDSA in libgcrypt and OpenSSL are designed to mitigate existing physical
and cache-based side channel attacks.
3.2.1 Our Contributions
This chapter presents a side-channel attack that recovers the secret ECDSA key by ana-
lyzing the signal that corresponds to a single ECDSA signing operation in the current (as
of this writing) versions of libgcrypt and OpenSSL. Specifically, our attack 1) identi-
fies the signal snippet that corresponds to each instance of the conditional swap operation,
2) determines which of the two possible values of the swap condition each signal snippet
corresponds to, 3) uses the values of the swap conditions, which directly correspond to
individual bits of the secret nonce in an ECDSA signing operation, to construct the set of
possible nonce values, 4) reconstructs the full private/public ECDSA key pair that corre-
sponds to each nonce candidate and 5) identifies which of the key pair candidates matches
the (known) public ECDSA key of the signing entity, and, thus, contains the signing entity’s
actual private ECDSA key.
We experimentally evaluate this attack for both libgcrypt and OpenSSL, for three
different target devices (two Android-based mobile phones and an IoT development board),
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using as training only two signal snippets, one for a point-scalar multiplication step where
the swap condition was 0, and one where the swap condition was 1. These training signals
were collected by executing an EC point-scalar multiplication, with a known value of the
nonce, on another physical instance of the target device. We repeat the attack 100 times
for each software-device combination, using a single signing operation, with a newly gen-
erated ECDSA key, in each of these 600 (100 x 2 software packages x 3 devices) attacks
instances. We find that the, in all 600 of these attack instances, the full private ECDSA key
is successfully recovered, with no attack instance requiring more than 1.3s of single-core
processing time for analysis and key reconstruction.
The key insight on which the attack is based is that, in both libgcrypt and OpenSSL,
within the conditional swap operation, the values of operands in exclusive-or operations are
systematically biased depending on the value of the condition. Specifically, when the swap
condition is zero (no actual swap is needed), exclusive-or operations all have zero-valued
operands, whereas when the swap condition is one (actual swap is needed) the exclusive-or
operations have operands whose bits are unbiased (1-valued bits appear just as often as
0-valued bits do). Because each conditional swap operations performs tens of exclusive-
or operations, all with the same bias in their operands, the resulting overall difference in
the side-channel signal is many times larger than the typical difference caused by bit-level
variation in operands of a single instruction. Therefore, even when the noise in the side
channel signal is significantly larger than the signal variation caused by different values of
individual instruction operands, the systematic difference caused by many instructions, all
having the same bias in all bits in one of their operands, becomes detectable in the signal.
Finally, we leverage this insight to develop a mitigating software change for both
libgcrypt and OpenSSL, which prevents this style of attack with a negligible impact
on performance. The mitigation consists of randomizing the exclusive-or difference values
in the conditional swap operation, which results in all exclusive-or operations, regardless
of the swap condition, being performed with operands whose bits are unbiased. We have
49
confirmed that this mitigation is effective in preventing this and similar attacks. We are
currently preparing to submit this mitigation to GnuPG and OpenSSL, and will work to
ensure that mitigation is merged into the main trunk of both source code repositories prior
to publication of this work.
3.2.2 Threat Model
We assume that the attacker can place the probe, along with a compact receiver, into close
physical proximity to the device that is performing an ECDSA signing operation. For
example, a smart-infrastructure or smart-city device may be in a physical location, and may
use Elliptic Curve (EC) cryptography to establish secure connections and/or sign messages
it transmits over the Internet. Another example would when an adversary hides the probe
and the receiver in a location where mobile phones and computer systems may be used,
e.g. under a desk, table, of charging station at an airport, in a coffee shop, etc.
We also do not assume that the adversary can choose (or even know) the message to
which ECDSA signing operation will be applied, or even choose the curve and/or the base
EC point for ECDSA signing operations, and we assume that the ECDSA implementation
under attack does utilize message and base-point blinding to mitigate such chosen-message
and chosen-point attacks.
Finally, we assume that it is highly advantageous for the attacker to recover the private
key when it is used, without having to wait for another use of the same key. This assumption
is often realistic in practice, because in many scenarios (e.g. smart-infrastructure devices)
the attacker can only briefly place the probe in close proximity to the victim system without
attracting suspicion, while in other scenario (coffee shop, airport) the victim system is
placed close to the attacker’s probe for only a short time. Furthermore, the victim system
may perform private-key EC operations sporadically, e.g. to set up a connection or to sign
emails that take a while to compose, so the attacker may not be able to collect signals for
more than one, or perhaps a few, signing operations.
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3.2.3 Targeted Software and Hardware
The software we target are the latest stable released versions of GnuPG/libgcrypt
(version 1.8.4) and OpenSSL (version 1.1.1a). In the target version of libgcrypt,
ECDSA uses EC point add and double operations with a conditional swap to imple-
ment constant-time, constant-control-flow, constant-data-access-pattern EC point multipli-
cation by a scalar. Notably, the ECDH implementation in the same version of libgcrypt
uses a the constant-time Montgomery ladder and conditional swaps for the same pur-
pose. In OpenSSL, ECDSA uses constant-time Montgomery ladder and conditional
swaps. Since our attack actually targets the conditional swap operation, it can target all of
these point-scalar multiplication implementations, regardless of whether they use separate
add and double operations or a Montgomery ladder step. The curves we use in our
experiments are curve Ed25519 for GnuPG and the secp256k1 curve for OpenSSL.
However, ECDSA signature computation, regardless of curve equations and choice of a
base point, have no material impact on our attack as they use the same point-scalar multi-
plication, and thus the same conditional swap, program code. Finally, both libgcrypt
and OpenSSL perform blinding of point and/or message values, but that has no material
effect on our attack because the value of the condition remains the same in each instance
of the conditional swap, regardless or message/point blinding.
The hardware we target are two ARM-based mobile phones (Alcatel Ideal and ZTE
ZFIVE), running under different versions of the Android operating system, and also an
ARM-based IoT prototype board (A13-OLinuXino), running under Debian Linux. We
consider our attack to be a non-intrusive but close-proximity attack, as the probe in our
experiments is placed in close proximity to each target device, but without opening the
device’s enclosure and without direct physical contact with the device.
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3.3 Background
3.3.1 Overview of ECDSA
ECDSA uses an Elliptic Curve (EC) to compute a cryptographic signature using a private
key and to verify the signature using the corresponding public key. First, the participating
parties must agree on a choice of curve parameters: the elliptic curve field and equation,
denoted here as CURVE, the base point of prime order on the curve, denoted here as G,
and an integer order of G, denoted here as n. Given the curve parameters (CURVE,G,n),
the signing entity (which we refer to as Alice) secretly chooses as its private key a random
positive integer dA such that 0 < dA < n, and computes the curve point QA = dA×G that
will serve as the public key that corresponds to the secret key dA. The public key is then
provided to the verifying entity, which we refer to here as Bob.
To sign a message, Alice first computes e, the cryptographic hash of the message, and
then computes z, the value of e truncated to the bit-length of n. Next, Alice randomly
chooses an ephemeral secret positive integer (nonce) k such that 0 < k < n, calculates the
curve point (x, y) = k×G where × stands for an EC point multiplication by a scalar, then
computes r = x mod n and s = k−1(̇z + rḋA) mod n. If either r or s is zero, a new k is
chosen and the signature is recomputed, otherwise the signature consists of the pair (r, s).
To verify the signature, Bob also computes the cryptographic hash of the message and
the corresponding value of z. Bob then computes w = s−1 mod n, u1 = zẇ mod n, and
u2 = rẇ mod n, then computes the curve point (x, y) = u1×G+u2×Q. The signature is
valid when r and s are both within the interval [1, n− 1], (x, y)! = O, and r ≡ x (mod n).
The attacker (which we refer to as Eve) already knows the curve parameters (CURVE,G,n),
and can typically obtain Alice’s public key QA and a large number of messages signed by
Alice. Under these conditions, Eve’s attempt to calculate the private key dA requires solv-
ing a complex discrete logarithm problem. However, if Eve can obtain the secret nonce k
for even one signature, the secret key dA can be trivially recovered as dA = (sk̇ − z)/r.
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One way for Eve to obtain the value of k is to mount a side channel attack during
Alice’s computation of the signature. Since the value of k is ephemeral - it is generated,
used to compute a signature for one message, and then discarded, Eve can try to extract
the value of k when it is used in EC point multiplication (k × G), or when its inverse is
used as a multiplicand to compute s. Of the two, the point multiplication is typically the
more promising target for the side channel attacks because it is more time-consuming and
because its implementation performs operations on curve points depending on the bits of
k, which has a tendency to leak information about k unless the implementation is very
carefully constructed to avoid doing so.
3.3.2 Point Multiplication by a Scalar
The naive implementation of EC point multiplication is shown in Figure 3.1.
1 E C p o i n t z e r o ( r ) ; / / r=0
2 / / For each b i t o f t h e s c a l a r k
3 f o r ( b= b i t s −1;b>=0;b−−){
4 E C p o i n t d o u b l e ( r , r ) ; / / r =2∗ r
5 i f ( B N i s b i t s e t ( k , b ) )
6 E C p o i n t a d d ( r , r , p ) ; / / r = r+p
7
8 }
Figure 3.1: A naive double-and-add implementation of EC point multiplication by a scalar.
In this implementation of point multiplication, for each bit of the scalar k, the previous
result r is doubled and, if the bit in k is non-zero, the point p is added to that result.
The point-double and point-add operations differ in both the code that is executed and
the data that is accessed, so various side channels can be used to recover the sequence of
these operations and, from that sequence, recover the bits of the scalar k. For example,
instruction cache accesses can be used to determine when each point-double and point-add
function call occurs, the timing of data cache accesses to p can be used to determine which
point-double operations are followed by point-add operations (note that p is only accessed
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during a point-add), and various analog side channel signals can be used to determine when
each point-double and point-add is executed.
For performance reasons, instead of a binary double-and-add implementation, both
libgcrypt and OpenSSL have until recently used an implementation based on the non-
adjacent form (NAF) of the scalar. In the NAF representation the scalar is still represented
as a sequence of digits, but each digit now represents multiple bits of the scalar. After
pre-computing the value of the point multiplied by each of the possible value of a digit,
the NAF-based implementation requires only one point-add for each non-zero digit in the
NAF representation of the scalar, and this significantly reduces the number of point-add
operations that are needed for the overall point multiplication. However, the pattern of
accesses to the table of pre-computed point values now directly corresponds to the NAF
representation of k, which allows cache-based attacks to easily recover k [75, 77, 78, 76].
Furthermore, the point-add is still skipped for a zero-valued NAF digit in k, so the sequence
of point-double and point-add operations still leaks partial information about k. This has
been exploited by analog side channel attacks, where partial information from multiple
signing operations (that use the same private key dA, but different scalars k) was combined
to eventually recover dA [72].
1 E C p o i n t z e r o ( r ) ; / / r=0
2 / / For each b i t o f t h e s c a l a r k
3 f o r ( b= b i t s −1;b>=0;b−−){
4 E C p o i n t d o u b l e ( r , r ) ; / / r =2∗ r
5 E C p o i n t a d d ( tmp , r , p ) ; / / tmp=r+p
6 / / Swap r and tmp i f b−t h b i t o f k i s 1
7 c u r r b i t = B N i s b i t s e t ( k , b ) ;
8 E C p o i n t s wa p c on d ( r , tmp , c u r r b i t ) ;
9 }
Figure 3.2: libgcrypt’s approach to constant-time point multiplication.
To mitigate the side-channel problems of the NAF-based implementation, both libgcrypt
and OpenSSL have recently switched to using constant-time implementations of point
multiplication for during ECDSA signing. Figure 3.2 shows the constant-time implementa-
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tion adapted from libgcrypt’s source code (function gcry mpi ec mul point()
in mpi/ec.c). This is a double-and-add implementation but, unlike the naive imple-
mentation, it executes a point-add for every bit in k, so the sequence of point-double and
point-add operations (and the data access pattern) no longer leaks information about k. The
output of the point-add operation (tmp in our code example) is then conditionally swapped
with the result r, using the bit of k as a condition that dictates whether the swap occurs
or not. When a zero-valued bit is encountered in k, tmp and r are left unchanged, which
effectively discards the result of the point-add operation. Conversely, when a one-valued
bit is encountered in k, the swap results in using the output of the point-add operation as
the new value of r.
1 E C p o i n t l a d d e r p r e p ( r , s , p ) ;
2 p r e v b i t =1 ;
3 / / For each b i t o f t h e s c a l a r k
4 f o r ( b= b i t s −1;b>=0;b−−){
5 c u r r b i t = B N i s b i t s e t ( k , b ) ;
6 E C p o i n t s wa p c on d ( r , s , c u r r b i t ˆ p r e v b i t ) ;
7 E C p o i n t l a d d e r s t e p ( r , s , p ) ;
8 p r e v b i t = c u r r b i t ;
9 }
10 EC p o i n t s wa p c on d ( r , s , p r e v b i t ) ;
11 E C p o i n t l a d d e r p o s t ( r , s , p ) ;
Figure 3.3: OpenSSL’s approach to constant-time point multiplication.
Figure 3.3 shows the constant-time implementation adapted from OpenSSL’s source
code (function ec scalar mul ladder() in crypto/ec/ec mult.c). It differs
from libgcrypt’s implementation in that the doubling and add operations are integrated
into a single Montgomery ladder [80, 81, 82] step, which also changes the condition used
for the swap - rather than performing the swap depending on each individual bit of the
scalar k, the swap is now performed when the i-th bit of k differs from the previous one.
In both libgcrypt’s and OpenSSL’s implementation of EC point multiplication, the
conditional swap is used to avoid having the control flow of the point multiplication depend
on individual bits of the scalar k. The implementations of the conditional swap itself in
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1 E C p o i n t s wa p c on d ( a , b , cond ) {
2 / / When cond i s 0 , s e t mask t o a l l−z e r o s
3 / / When cond i s 1 , s e t mask t o a l l−ones
4 mask=0−cond ;
5 / / For each machine word i n t h e
6 / / EC p o i n t r e p r e s e n t a t i o n
7 f o r ( i =0 ; i<nwords ; i ++){
8 d e l t a = ( a−>w[ i ] ˆ b−>w[ i ] ) & mask ;
9 a−>w[ i ] = a−>w[ i ] ˆ d e l t a ;
10 b−>w[ i ] = b−>w[ i ] ˆ d e l t a ;
11 }
12 }
Figure 3.4: Constant-time conditional swap. When cond is true, EC points a and b are
swapped, otherwise they are left unchanged.
libgcrypt and in OpenSSL are very similar, and Figure 3.4 shows the implementation
of conditional swap adapted from libgcrypt’s function grcy mpi swap cond) in
source code file mpi/mpiutil.c. An EC point is stored as one large numbers for each
coordinate, and each number is stored as a sequence of machine words. For each machine
word in the EC point representation, a bitwise exclusive-or (XOR) is used to compute the
bit-wise difference between the word in EC point a and the corresponding word in EC point
b. The mask is then applied to this difference, such that the difference is either kept as-is
or zeroed out, depending on the condition cond. This masked difference is then applied
(via XOR operations) to the two words. The ends result is that, when cond is true, the
values of the two EC points are swapped, but when cond is false the two points are left
unchanged. The key property of this conditional swap is that the same instruction sequence
is executed, and the same sequence of data accesses is performed, regardless of the value
of the condition, which prevents cache-based and many analog-signal side channel attacks
from obtaining information about the value of the swap’s condition, and thus about the bits
of the scalar k in the EC point multiplication.
Because constant-time point multiplication implementations in both libgcrypt and
OpenSSL result in executing exactly the same sequence of instructions, and exactly the
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same sequence of data accesses, regardless of the value of scalar k, they prevent side chan-
nel attacks that exploit either instruction or data cache behavior, as well analog side channel
attacks that rely on detecting signal differences caused by executing different program code
depending on the bits of the scalar k.
However, we make a key observation that the conditional swap implementation creates
systematic condition-dependent differences in the values of operands used by XOR instruc-
tions, and in the bit-toggling activity among words in the internal representation of the two
EC points. Specifically, when cond is true, the mask is all-ones, which results in values
of delta that have about the same number of 0-valued and 1-valued bits, and this results in
toggling about half of the bits in each word of EC points a and b. In contrast, when cond
is false, the mask is all-zeroes, so the delta for each pair of words is zero, and no bits are
toggled in any of the words that represent EC points a and b. The standard curve parameters
we use result in a 256-bit number for each coordinate of an EC point, which means that
operations on several tens of 32-bit machine words are systematically affected this way by
the value of of cond, and we exploit the resulting difference in the processor’s electromag-
netic emanations to reconstruct the secret nonce k, and thus the private key, using the signal
collected during only one instance of a signing operation.
3.4 The Nonce@Once Attack
This section describes our new attack on the constant-time point multiplication implemen-
tations in libgcrypt and OpenSSL. In this attack, the processor’s electromagnetic (EM)
emanations are recorded during execution of a single instance of an ECDSA signing op-
eration. This recorded EM signal is then analyzed to identify the parts of the signal that
correspond to each conditional swap operation, and for each of these operations to identify
the value of the swap condition (true of false). The sequence of swap condition values is
then used to reconstruct the ephemeral secret nonce k used in the ECDSA signing opera-
tion and, by combining the recovered value of k with the (non-secret) ECDSA signature,
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recover the signing party’s private ECDSA key.
This attack is the first side channel attack that targets the constant-time implementations
of point multiplication that have been recently introduced in libgcrypt and OpenSSL,
which were both designed to resist side channel attacks. This attack is very powerful in
that it efficiently recovers the secret ECDSA key after observing only one instance of an
ECDSA signing operation.
3.4.1 EM Signal Acquisition
The side channel signal used in our attack consists of electromagnetic (EM) emanations
created by the victim system’s processor as it executed instructions. Although the actual
values of the bits in each of the operands in an individual instruction create only minuscule
differences in this emanated EM signal, the values of operands during a conditional swap
operation create thousands of such bit-wise differences in a systematic way, making the
resulting difference in EM emanations strong enough to be observed when the signal is
collected using our custom-made high-gain probes that are placed just outside be victim
system’s (unopened) case. The signal from the probe is then filtered, down-converted, and
digitally recorded using an off-the-shelf software-defined radio (SDR) receiver, such that
the recorded signal samples correspond to several megahertz (MHz) of radio-frequency
bandwidth around the victim system’s processor clock frequency. The recorded signal is
then digitally filtered and demodulated before it is subjected to the custom signal analysis
that implements our attack.
3.4.2 Identifying Signal Snippets that correspond to Conditional Swap Operations
The information we extract from the signal is the condition (swap or not) used in each
conditional-swap operation withing the EC point-scalar multiplication. The first step in the
signal analysis is to identify the part of the signal that corresponds to the overall point-by-
scalar multiplication. This can be trivially accomplished by changing the source code of
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libgcrypt and OpenSSL to create a highly recognizable signal pattern just before and
just after the point-by-scalar multiplication function is called during an ECDSA signing
operation, or to record a high-resolution time-stamp and identify the corresponding real-
time point in the signal. However, in most realistic attack scenarios such modification of
the victim’s code would not be possible, so instead we execute the victim code as-is, and
identify the point-scalar multiplication purely through signal analysis.
The key observation for this signal analysis is that most of the execution time in point-
scalar multiplication is spent on repeated point-double and point-add operations in libg-
crypt, and on point-ladder-step operations in OpenSSL, and these point operations are
designed such that all instances of their execution have as little variation as possible in
their execution time, control flow path, and data access pattern. If a training sample of
a point-double and point-add (for libgcrypt), or a training sample of a point-ladder-
step (for OpenSSL) is available, we use moving correlation with that sample to identify
the part of the signal that contains an appropriate number of repetitions of the sample. In
our experiments we find that the point-double, point-add, and point-ladder-step operations
are long enough, and have enough prominent signal features, to only require one training
sample of each, i.e. the training signal corresponds to the work for only one bit in the scalar
k during one signing operation, and we do not need the knowledge of the value of that bit
in k.
Since the point operation always follows the same control flow path, the duration of
the period can be estimated, either by statically analyzing the program code, or by run-
ning the point-by-scalar multiplication code on another computer system to obtain an es-
timate (within one or two orders of magnitude) for the number of processor cycles for a
point-multiplication step. Since this estimate need not be very precise, the profiling can
be performed on a very different computer system, e.g. an x86-based PC workstation with
2.7 GHz clock frequency provides a sufficiently accurate estimate to identify the point-
scalar multiplication when attacking an ARM-based mobile phone with an 800MHz clock
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frequency. The number of periods corresponds to the number of bits in k, and it is de-
termined by the curve parameters used in ECDSA. In OpenSSL the number of steps is
always equal to the maximum number of bits in the nonce k, which is determined by the
curve parameters, and is equal to 256 bits or the ecp256k1 curve we use in OpenSSL.
In libgcrypt we used Ed25519, which also results in the maximum nonce size of 256
bits, but in libgcrypt the point-scalar multiplication omits the steps that correspond to
leading zeros in the nonce, so the actual number of steps can be smaller than 256. However,
very small nonces (many leading zeros) are highly unlikely, so if we require the number
of steps to be between 128 and 256, there is only an astronomically small chance (about
one occurrence in three hundred million decillion signing operation) of a false negative
(missing a point-scalar multiplication in the overall signal). In our experiments we have
experienced no false positives (falsely identifying a point-scalar multiplication), but if such
a false positive were to occur, our reconstruction of the private ECDSA key would find that
no private-key candidate constructed using this signal is viable (does not match the signer’s
known public key).
The next step in our analysis is to identify the parts of the signal that corresponds to
individual conditional swap operations, so that each snippet can be analyzed to identify the
value of the condition (swap or no swap) that was used in that instance of the conditional
swap. The conditional swap itself is too brief to be reliably detected by matching to a
training sample of the swap itself, but we can leverage the observation that the conditional
swap is executed between a point-add in one step and the point-double in the next step (in
gnupg) and between one point-ladder-step and the next one (in OpenSSL). Therefore,
if a training sample of each of these point operations is available, we can match them in
the signal, identify where each such operation begins and ends, and then extract the signal
between the end of a point-add (or the end of a point-ladder-step) and the beginning of the
next point-double (or the next point-ladder step) as the swap-related signal snippet.
Even though libgcrypt and OpenSSL have similar overall approaches to imple-
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menting the overall point-scalar multiplication and, especially, the conditional swap, their
actual program code differs enough to prevent using the actual signal from one to attack
the other. To illustrate the similarities and differences between their signals, Figure 3.5
shows the signal that corresponds to a conditional swap and the next point operation in
libgcrypt and in OpenSSL.
0 50 100 150 200 250 300
Time [us]
CS DOUBLE - ADDCSDOUBLE - ADD
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
Time [us]
CS DOUBLE - ADD CS DOUBLE - ADD
Figure 3.5: Signal example for libgcrypt (left) and for OpenSSL (right). The signal
for a conditional swap is indicated by a solid red rectangle, while the signal for the next
point operation is indicated by a dashed black rectangle.
3.4.3 Recovering the Value of the Swap Condition from a Snippet
Once the signal snippet for each instance of the conditional swap is identified, the final step
in our signal analysis is to categorize them according to the value of the condition that has
been used. As described in Section 3.3, the conditional swap constructs a mask, which is
either all-zeros or all-ones depending on the swap condition, and then applies this mask
to an exclusive-or-based swap for each machine word in the internal representation of two
EC points, such that the two words remain the same if the swap condition was false, or
the value of the two words are exchanged it the swap condition was false. The internal
representation of an EC point includes the large-number coordinates of the point, where
each coordinate is stored as an array of several machine words, as well as several machine
words that contain metadata about the EC point, such as its size (in machine words), sign,
and other information. The default curve parameters we use in our experiments result in
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256-bit coordinates, i.e. eight 32-numbers per coordinate, with three dimensions, for a total
of 24 words for coordinates, and nearly 30 words total per point. Thus a conditional swap
whose condition is false performs about 60 exclusive-or operations whose one operand is
always zero, and accesses about 60 machine words that are all left unchanged, while a
conditional swap whose condition is true performs those 60 exclusive-or operations with
non-zero operands that have about the same number zeros and ones, and changes about 60
machine words by toggling about half of the bits in each word. The signal snippets that
correspond to libgcrypt’s conditional swap with one-valued and zero-valued condition
are shown in the top part of Figure 3.6, where the signal differences produced by different
values of the swap condition can be clearly observed, and we can even discern three bursts
of these signal differences that correspond to the three calls to libgcrypt’s internal
gcry mpi swap cond function, once for each coordinate, during the execution of the
point swap cond function.
















Figure 3.6: Signal snippets that correspond to conditional swap in libgcrypt (left) and
OpenSSL (right) when the swap condition is true (points are actually swapped, signal
shown in blue) and when the swap condition is false (points unchanged, signal shown in
red).
Because the signal snippets exhibit significant differences depending on the swap con-
dition, when training examples of true-condition and false-condition snippets are available,
we use simple correlation between the candidate snippet and two training examples of each
kind (two for false-condition and two for true-condition), and we assign the swap condi-
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tion of the best-matching (highest-correlation) training example as the candidate snippet’s
reconstructed value of the swap condition.
3.4.4 Candidate Nonce Values
From the signal analysis, we obtain the reconstructed value for the swap’s condition (vari-
able cond in Figure 3.4) from each swap-related signal snippet that has been identified, and
from the timing between identified signal snippets we obtain the positions of the missing
swap-related snippets. In libgcrypt the reconstructed values for cond directly corre-
spond to individual bits of the nonce k, while the missing snippets correspond to unknown
bits in the reconstructed nonce. We thus construct a set of candidate nonce values where all
possible values for the unknown bits are represented, and we subject this set of candidate
nonces to our algorithm that recovers ECDSA private keys (Section 3.4.5). Note that each
missing snippet doubles the number of candidate nonces, so recovery of private keys can
only be efficient when relatively few snippets are missing.
For OpenSSL, the reconstructed value of cond in each swap-related signal snippet
corresponds to the difference in value between the current bit in k and the previous one.
Therefore, a missing snippet results in having to consider both possibilities for the current
bit of k, and also having to perform reconstruction of the rest of the nonce under each of
the two assumptions. This is only a minor complication, because a change in the value
of one bit in the nonce can be accounted for by toggling all bits that are less significant.
Aside from that, the effect of missing snippets on the number of candidate nonces is the
same as in libgcrypt – each missing snippet doubles the number of candidate nonces.
Additionally, OpenSSL treats the most significant bit of the nonce as a special case, and
to keep our signal analysis simpler we do not attempt to identify the signal snippet that
corresponds to that bit or recover its value. Even with this additional unknown bit, in
practice our signal analysis produces relatively few candidate nonces and thus leads to
rapid recovery of the ECDSA private key.
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3.4.5 Full Recovery of ECDSA Private Keys
Our recovery of the private ECDSA key considers each candidate nonce to determine if it
produces a private ECDSA key that matches the known public key. Specifically, for each
candidate nonce value kc, we use the known values of z, r, s (z can be computed from the
message that has been signed, and r and s are part of the ECDSA signature that has been
computed) to compute a candidate private key dc, using the equation
dc = (skc − z)/r mod n
as described in Section 3.3.1. We then use this candidate private key dc to calculate the
corresponding public key Qc = dc × G, and compare that public key Qc to the publicly
available actual public key QA of the signing entity (Alice). If Qc is equal to QA, the
signing entity’s private key dA is equal to the candidate private key dc, and the analysis
completes successfully. If qc differs from QA, the next candidate nonce value is taken as
kc, the corresponding dc and Qc are computed, and the analysis continues until it either
discovers the ECDSA private key dA or runs out of nonce candidates.
In our experimental evaluation we have tested our signal analysis on 100 ECDSA sign-
ing operations, each with a different private key, and we have applied our signal analysis
and full private-key recovery to each of these 100 ECDSA signing operations. We found
that our signal analysis produces up to 2048 nonce candidates for each signing operation
(i.e. up to 11 bits in the 256-bit nonce were unknown). The full recovery of the ECDSA
private key was successfully completed for each of the 100 signing operations, which im-
plies that in each set of candidate nonces the correct nonce was among the candidates,
which further implies that every swap-related signal snippet that was identified in our ex-
periments has produced a correct reconstruction for the cond value used in that instance of
the conditional swap operation. Overall, no signature required more than 1.3 seconds of
analysis run-time to recover the correct private key, using only a single core on a moderately
powerful laptop system (a Macbook Pro with an 2.7 GHz Intel Core i5 processor).
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3.5 Experimental Evaluation
In this section we describe our measurement setup and results or recovering private keys
from GnuPG and OpenSSL during ECDSA signature computation on three different de-
vices.
3.5.1 Experimental Setup
We run GnuPG‘s llibgcrypt and OpenSSL applications on two Android cell phones,
Alcatel Ideal [51] and ZTE ZFIVE LTE2 [83], and on an A13-OLinuXino IoT development
board [52]. The Alcatel Ideal has a quad-core 1.1 GHz Qualcomm Snapdragon processor
with Android version 6, while the ZTE ZFIVE has a quad-core 1.4 GHz Qualcomm Snap-
dragon processor with Android version 6.0.1. The A13-OLinuXino is a single-board com-
puter with an ARM Cortex A8 processor [53] with Debian Linux. For both libgcrypt
and OpenSSL, we use the latest released version at the time we were working on this
project – libgcrypt version 1.8.4, and OpenSSL version 1.1.1a. Both libgcrypt
and OpenSSL use a constant-time implementation of point-scalar multiplication, relying
on conditional swap operations to avoid control flow that depends on the bis of the scalar.
We use Ed25519 in libgcrypt and ecp256k1 curve in OpenSSL. Both are com-
monly used curves, and for both the maximum order n is a 256-bit value, which also means
that the secret nonce k used during ECDSA signing is at most 256 bits in size. We note,
however, that the choice of the curve has no significant impact on our attack – ECDSA with
any curve uses the same point-scalar multiplication to multiply the base point G with the
secret nonce k, and this point-scalar multiplication is implemented as a sequence of steps,
with each of these steps examining a bit of k and using the constant-time conditional swap
whose condition directly corresponds to a bit in k (in libgcrypt of to the difference
between the current and the previous bit in k (in OpenSSL). It should also be noted that, in
addition to using constant-time operations, side-channel defenses in libgcrypt and/or
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Figure 3.7: Experimental setup for receiving EM emanations from the ZTE ZFIVE (left)
and Alcatel Ideal (right). The mechanical arm holds the custom probe (flat circular beige
object at the end of the silver-colored cable held by the arm) close (but without touching)
the phone, and the Ettus B200-mini SDR (white box) digitizes the signal and sends it
through a USB cable to a personal computer (not shown) for analysis.
OpenSSL include message blinding and point blinding, which prevents the attacker from
choosing the message and/or the base point in a way that increases side-channel leakage of
information. However, message and point blinding have no effect on how the value of the
nonce k is used in point-scalar multiplication, so they also have no effect on our attack.
Our setup for collecting the electromagnetic emanations from these devices is shown
in Figure 3.7. It consists of a small custom electric probe to receive the EM signals, an
Ettus B200-mini [84] software defined radio (SDR) to digitize the EM signal in the desired
frequency band, and a personal computer to to process the digitized signals. As show in
Figure 3.7, the probe is placed is close physical proximity to the target device, but without
touching the device an without opening its enclosure. A mechanical arm is used to hold
the probe in the desired position during the experiments. The probe is connected to the
compact SDR which digitizes the signal and sends it, through a USB cable, to a personal
computer (not shown in Figure 3.7) where the signal analysis and ECDSA key recovery is
implemented as a custom program in MATLAB. Note that MATLAB is used mainly for
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convenience, and that signal analysis and key recovery would likely be significantly faster
if it were implemented in C/C++ on the personal computer. Even the need for a personal
computer could likely be eliminated, at the cost of a significant hardware design effort, by
implementing the analysis and key recovery as a custom hardware design within the Field
Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) that is available within the B-200mini SDR itself.
3.5.2 Attack Results
Our experimental results are based on repeating the attack 100 times for libgcrypt and
100 times for OpenSSL on each device. In each attack, we first randomly generate an
ECDSA private key and a message. Then we initiate signal collection while this ECDSA
private key is used to sign the message. The signal from this single ECDSA signing opera-
tion is then analyzed to recover the nonce k and the ECDSA private key dA, and finally the
recovered dA is compared to the actual dA to determine whether the attack was successful.
We note that we directly used the cryptographic API in both libgcrypt and OpenSSL
to initiate the signing operation, rather than use a real-world application (like Apache for
OpenSSL or Enigmail for Libgcrypt) to initiate a signing operation. However, since
our attack identifies the part of the signal that corresponds to the EC point-scalar multipli-
cation, this direct use of the cryptographic API has no material impact on the success of
the attack, and we use direct API calls primarily because that substantially reduces the time
needed to collect, store, and process the signals.
Our first set of experimental results consists of attacking a single instance of libg-
crypt’s ECDSA signing operation, repeating this attack 100 times on each of the three
target devices (ZTE, Alcatel Ideal and OLinuXino IoT board). All 300 of these attack in-
stances were successful in recovering the ECDSA private signing key. More detail on the
success of our attack is shown in Figure 3.8 where, for each device, we show the clustering
of the signal snippets that correspond to the two values of the condition in the conditional
swap, and we show the histogram for the number of candidate values for the nonce k that
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Figure 3.8: Libgcrypt detection of nonce bit based on the swap function clustering
on bit 0 and bit 1 (left), Libgcrypt pdf distribution for the candidate nonce (right) for
various devices.
were considered before the value of the ECDSA key was recovered. We can observe that,
for all three devices, the signal snippets that correspond to the two possible values of the
68
swap condition are in well-separated clusters, so these clusters can be used to recover the
value of the swap condition that was used during each signal snippet. We also observe
that, for all three devices, the number of candidates that were considered is at most 216
(for the ZTE). We also observe that for the OLinuXino board our attack typically needs to
consider at most 26 candidate nonce values, that the number of candidates for the Alcatel
Ideal is typically at most 28 or whereas for the two phones the typical number of candi-
dates is larger. These differences are primarily caused by differences in how often there
are occurrences of interrupts and other activity on these devices. Recall (Section 3.4.2) that
we use timing to determine the position of the missing snippets, but that a missing snippet
results in an unknown value of the swap condition at that position, and thus doubles the
number of candidate nonce values that must be considered. We observe that on the two
Android-based devices interrupts occur significantly more often than on the DEbian-based
OLinuXino. Finally, on the ZTE phone the signal for Libgcrypt’s point multiplication is
unusually ”choppy”, resulting in sporadic failures to identify the swap snippets even in the
absence of interrupts and other interference. Even on the ZTE, however, the number of
candidates is so low that the worst-case analysis time was only 1.3 seconds when perform-
ing the analysis using only a single core in MATLAB on a moderately powerful laptop
computer (a Macbook Pro with a 2.7GHz Intel Core i5 processor).
Our second set of experiments is for OpenSSL, where we also repeat the single-
signing-operation attack 100 times for of the three devices. Figure 3.9 shows the clustering
of signal snippets, and the number of candidate values for the nonce, for this set of experi-
ments. We observe that, compared to libgcrypt, OpenSSL produces even more distinct
clusters of snippets according to their value of the swap condition, i.e. the swap condition
can be recovered from each signal snippet even more reliably than in libgcrypt.
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Figure 3.9: OpenSSL detection of nonce bit based on the swap function clustering on




Our mitigation is based on the key insight that, within the conditional swap operation, there
are tens of machine words in the data structure that represents each of the two EC points,
and to each of these machine words the conditional-swap function applies an exclusive-
or whose other operand is either zero (when the swap condition is false) or has the value
of the bit-wise change mask that changes that word’s value to its new value. Although
the difference in EM signals between an exclusive-or with a zero value and an exclusive-or
with a semi-random value is very small, the conditional swap’s signal performs tens of such
operations, all with the same bias in their operands, and we believe that it is this systematic
difference that enables the reliable clustering of conditional-swap signal snippets according
to the value of the condition that was used.
1 E C p o i n t s wa p c on d ( a , b , cond ) {
2 / / When cond i s 0 , s e t mask t o a l l−z e r o s
3 / / When cond i s 1 , s e t mask t o a l l−ones
4 mask=0−cond ;
5 / / Random v a l u e f o r m i t i g a t i o n
6 rand =random word ( ) ;
7 / / For each machine word
8 f o r ( i =0 ; i<nwords ; i ++){
9 d e l t a = ( a−>w[ i ] ˆ b−>w[ i ] ) & mask ;
10 d e l t a = d e l t a ˆ r and ;
11 asm v o l a t i l e (
12 / / No a c t u a l a s s e m b l e r code
13 ‘ ‘ ; ’ ’
14 / / But s p e c i f y t h a t rand i s changed
15 : ‘ ‘+ r ’ ’ ( r and )
16 : : ) ;
17 a−>w[ i ] = ( a−>w[ i ] ˆ d e l t a ) ˆ r and ;
18 b−>w[ i ] = ( b−>w[ i ] ˆ d e l t a ) ˆ r and ;
19 }
20 }
Figure 3.10: Libgcrypt mitigation code where random bits are added into conditional
swap function. The value of delta is masked to avoid systematic cond-dependent dif-
ferences in exclusive-or operands.
To test this hypothesis and attempt to mitigate the vulnerability to the proposed attack,
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we modify the source code of the conditional swap function shown in Figure 3.10. Specif-
ically, we apply a random exclusive-or mask rand to the delta that is being applied to a
pair of words via exclusive-or operations. For each word, the modified difference delta is
applied (via an exclusive-or operation) first, and then the mask rand is applied (also via an
exclusive-or) to undo the effect of applying the mask to the original value of the difference.
The net effect of this is that, when the condition has a zero value, the exclusive-or opera-
tions are all performed with the value of rand, while when the condition value is one, the
exclusive-or operations are performed with the modified difference and then the value of
rand. However, the modified difference and the rand value both have unbiased values of
their bits, i.e. 0-value and 1-value bits are equally likely, so different values of the condition
no longer create the systematic difference in EM signals that the original implementation
of conditional swap was producing. To leverage this change, we used gccs extended inline
assembly syntax to tell the compiler that the effect of the rand value should not be removed.
We verify, as shown in Figure 3.11, that after this mitigation the clusters that corre-
spond to the two values of the swap condition are no longer separable, and we further
verify that our attack’s recovery of the value of the swap condition, once the mitigation is
implemented, has accuracy that is statistically equivalent to random guessing.
Figure 3.11: Detection of nonce bit based on the swap function clustering on bit 0 and bit
1 for Libgcrypt (left) and OpenSSL (right) after mitigation
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Overall, we have experimentally confirmed that our proposed mitigation is successfully
preventing the attack.
3.7 Related Work
Side-channel attacks [63, 64] have been demonstrated on numerous cryptographic imple-
mentations, and EM side channels have been exploited for attacking smart cards and other
small devices [56, 57, 58]. Alenka et. al demonstrated the experimental setup [60] for
emanated EM signal from modern processors, quantify [85, 86, 87] these leakages on dif-
ferent embedded devices, and detect malware [88, 89] by using spectral profiling [90]. The
knowledge of these techniques are very important to implement our attack, in particular,
our evaluation uses signals obtained by demodulating the signal from 40 MHz around the
processor’s clock frequency (around 1GHz).
Previous physical side channel attacks mentioned in the surveys [91, 92] targeted the
ECC primitives implementations on small devices. Most of these attacks take advantage
of naive implementations which contain key-dependent branches for add and double.
Physical side channel attacks on complex devices are first demonstrated by Genkin et. al
[30, 93] on RSA implementations. Different authors successfully demonstrated the EM
based physical side channel attacks: on ECDH on PCs [72], on ECDSA on iPhone [73],
on ECDSA on android smart phone [74]. All these attacks target the OpenSSL‘s wNaf
based scalar by point multiplication. They used solver based techniques to retrieve full
secret key.
FLUSH+RELOAD technique by Yarom et. al is applied to wide range of crypto system
breaking (OpenSSL and Libgcrypt) by observing cache-side channel [75, 77, 78, 76].
It exploited the wNaf implementation of scalar by point multiplication part of these crypto
benchmarks and revealed partial keys and broke full keys by using different solvers [94].
All these techniques are not valid any more (after 1.7.6 version released) when Libgcrypt
enforce control-flow less and so-called constant time Montgomery ladder for ECDH and
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control-flow less add-double with constant time implementation of swap function to
exchange the values between two big numbers. OpenSSL initially enforced w-ary wNaf
which was considered to be secured till their last stable release of 1.1.0h version. Al-
though, OpenSSL very recently released their stable version 1.1.1 which enforce constant
time Montgomery ladder in the place of add-double and use the same logic of swap
function that was used by Libgcrypt to exchange the values between two big numbers so
that correct result would be obtained without any control flow dependency. Unfortunately,
Genkin et. al successfully break the ECDH on 1.7.6 version of Libgcrypt over the curve
Curve25519 [79]. They found that the field arithmetic operations for the Curve25519
are not constant time implementation and they broke the key by using chosen cipher text.
As a countermeasure, the latest version of Libgcrypt (1.8.3) enforces point blindness
as well as message blindness. All the signing operations execute on random digest and the
generator G is masked with a random number to produce random base point such that all
the point calculations happen on this random point. The attacker neither has ability to
perform chosen cipher text attack nor to guess generator or base point to be operated on.
Similarly, OpenSSL recently released the stable version where ECDSA signing default
implementation introduces message and points blinding, Montgomery ladder and constant
time swap for scalar by point multiplication. It is seemed that the crypto libraries are
secure against all the previous techniques.
Recently, EM signal is used for control flow tracking [48] and it is applied for breaking
secret key. Very recently, One&Done [95] breaks secret exponent dp and dq over constant
time OpenSSL’s RSA implementation with a single EM trace and retrieves full RSA key.
The success of these type of attacks depends on the ability to capture demodulated signals
around the clock and to identify a very small signal variation due to changes of data-flow
over secret components. Our present work combines all the knowledge and techniques used
by these two works. We emphasize on the fact that leakage not only depends on control-
flow or different cache access for add-double or Montgomery ladder implementation,
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but also depends on small data-flow over the secret bits, i.e., the swap function where
processor behaves differently when it executes logical AND of 0/1 values with a big number.
Hence, it emits EM signals with characteristic signatures which help us to reveal the bit the
swap function is operating on.
We can classify our work as an example of Simple Power Analysis (SPA) [63], which is
a classic power analysis technique and is a very simple but powerful attack comparing with
Differential Power Analysis (DPA) [96]. Instead of power, we use EM as a side-channel
information.
3.8 Conclusion
We present a new physical side-channel attack on ECDSA implementations of GnuPG’s
Libgcrypt and OpenSSL where so called control-flow independent constant time im-
plementations are enforced. We have observed that there exist meaningful EM emissions
during conditional swap of two big numbers (256-bit). Our attack is based on the electro-
magnetic (EM) emissions generated while the device performs cryptographic operations,
such as digital signature and verification. We can split the proposed attack into two phases
as training and detection. In the first phase, we train our system using different per-message
keys, which are captured EM images of nonce-bit reading together with such swap for
different keys followed by processing the EM signals in the time-domain. In the detection
phase, with a single trace, we compare the images of conditional swap (bit-0 or bit-1)
of test signals with trained signals. We found that our approach can detect > 99% secret
nonce bits for constant time ECDSA implementations for the both crypto benchmarks.
We also propose a countermeasure to hinder this vulnerability. With the proposed counter-
measure implemented on the current Libgcrypt and OpenSSL, we could not separate
the swap based on 0/1 bit computation. To evaluate the robustness and effectiveness of our
attacks and corresponding countermeasure, we ported the latest stable version of GnuPG’s
Libgcrypt (1.8.4) and latest version of OpenSSL (1.1.1a) into two cell phones and one
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embedded device, and executed applications that use the sign/verify libraries. We demon-
strate that our approach works across different devices.
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CHAPTER 4
RETHINKING DSA IMPLEMENTATIONS: A NEW ATTACK METHOD WITH A
FEW EM TRACES
4.1 Abstract
While various optimization and counter-measures are enforced for public key crypto (PKC)
implementations, there exist some so called ”glue-codes” which exhibit key dependency.
Capturing emanated signals while executing these ”glue-codes” can lead to break PKC
implementations. In that respect, we present a new physical side-channel attack on PKC
implementations of OpenSSL. In particular, we consider DSA implementation as a use
case, which utilizes constant-time fixed-window (m-ary) modular exponentiation. Our at-
tack is based on the electromagnetic (EM) emissions generated while the device performs
cryptographic operations, such as digital signature and verification. We have observed that
there exist meaningful EM emissions during ”Window” computation for DSA sliding and
fixed window implementations. We can split the proposed attack into two phases as train-
ing and detection. In the first phase, we train our system using different per-message keys,
which are captured EM images of window computations for different keys followed by pro-
cessing the EM signals in the time-domain. In the detection phase, with a single trace, we
compare the images of window computations of test signals with trained signals. We found
that our approach can detect 99% exponent bits for constant time DSA implementations.
We also propose some counter-measures to hinder this vulnerability. With the proposed
counter-measures implemented on the current OpenSSL, we could not detect more than
50% bits for fixed-window. We demonstrated different implementation aspects and their
effects as countermeasures which embrace the importance of re-thinking before designing
and implementing PKC, in general. To evaluate the robustness and effectiveness of our
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attacks and corresponding counter-measures, we ported the latest version(at the time of
our experiment) of OpenSSL (1.1.0g) to two cell phones and one embedded device, and
executed applications that use the OpenSSL sign/verify libraries. We demonstrate that our
approach works across different devices.
4.2 Introduction
Physical side-channel cryptanalysis is a very effective approach to break a secure crypto
system. The attacks are based on signals generated from a processor while it carries out
computations. These signals include electromagnetic emanations created by current flows
within the computational and power delivery circuitry of a device [56, 57, 57, 60, 61], vari-
ations in power consumption during computation [62, 63, 64], acoustic [65, 30] and also
temperature [66]. Prior physical side-channel attacks on PKC implementations rely on clas-
sifying signals corresponding to a large-integer square and multiply operations [29, 30, 31].
The focus on identifying this long-lasting subsequence was to identify overall sequence of
samples corresponding to entire exponentiation. Also, these large integer square-multiply
operations produce enough samples to classify them successfully even with relatively low
sampling rate. The classification of these long-lasting square-multiplications would be dif-
ficult when the sequence of square-multiplications are not key dependent and when the
attacker can not control the input message that would be exponentiated.
Keeping these in mind, open-source and commercial crypto libraries enforce many
types of optimizations and counter-measures. For example, OpenSSL implements con-
stant time Montgomery ladder to counter the square-multiply sequence identification. The
ladder is implemented such a way that for both the square and multiply operations, it exe-
cutes the same function with different parameters to ensure the constant execution time for
either case. To counter cache timing attacks, OpenSSL executes constant time operations
by accessing the cache table for pre-computed values. Intel developed a scatter-gather
technique to enforce this constant time operation. These techniques, which prevent key
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Table 4.1: Comparison between the proposed and other approaches, based on 1) which al-
gorithm (sliding or fix window) it is applied on, 2) the applications (OpenSSH) and Library
(like OpenSSL, GnuPG) used to break the PKC, 3) how many traces are required to break
the key (normally it can take several traces to average the signals enough to eliminate the
noise), 4) the target device that the attack is performed (the approach would be more ac-
ceptable if it attacks commonly used devices, such as cell phones, PCs, etc), 5) how many
bits can be detected correctly (this is important for breaking full key without a brute-force
attack).
Ref (1) (2) (3) (4) 5
Algorithm Target Number of Target Accuracy
Application Trace Devices (%)
[31] Sliding / OpenSSL 1433600 PC 100
Fix Window
[29] Sliding / GnuPG 640 PC 100
Fix Window
[30] Square and multiply GnuPG 1000 PC 100
[97] Fix Window OpenSSL 16000 PC 60
Sliding / 3 (Embedded Device) Cell Phones
This work Fix Window OpenSSL 10(Samsung) Embedded Device 100
50(Alcatel)
exploitation presented in [29, 30, 31], are used when OpenSSL computes constant-time
window exponentiation.
While there are various optimization considerations and counter-measures enforced for
PKC implementation, there still exist some so called ”glue-codes” which exhibit key de-
pendency. Capturing and identifying emanated signals while executing these ”glue-codes”
make it possible to break PKC implementation. We successfully identify these codes and
break constant time DSA implementation of OpenSSL on two cell phones and one embed-
ded device. Comparing with other works, we exploit almost all exponent bits with a single
EM trace and retrieve a full key with a few measurement traces (Table 4.1).
4.2.1 Our Contribution
Breaking Constant-time OpenSSL’s DSA Implementation. We have seen that the
Montgomery multiplication produces a unique and identifiable EM pattern which makes it
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easy to isolate any bit of key computation at the edge of such multiplication. By obtaining
enough training pattern, we are able to break 99% nonce constant time DSA signing op-
eration with a single EM trace. We retrieve the full DSA private key out of the predicted
nonce with maximum 22 EM traces, in worst case (section 4.4).
Counter-measure and Insight over PKC implementation. We also provide some
counter-measure techniques and implemented these on top of the current OpenSSL. We
demonstrated different implementation aspects and their effectiveness as countermeasure.
This analysis embraces the importance of re-thinking before design and implementing
PKC, in general (section 4.6).
Evaluation on Commercial Devices. We carried out an experimental evaluation by using
OpenSSL native libraries and tested our attack on two cell phones: Android based Sam-
sung smart phone and Android based Alcatel Lucent smart phone; and an ARM embedded
device. The clock frequency for the tested devices are 1 GHz and, we observe that our
approach works across all devices (section 4.5).
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.3 presents the background of DSA al-
gorithm and it’s implementation aspects of OpenSSL. Section 4.4 presents a new attack
methodology. Section 4.5 provides experimental setup and the evaluation on different
devices. Section 4.6 discusses some mitigations with experimental results. Section 4.7
presents the sliding-window implementation of DSA and section 4.8 concludes the chap-
ter.
4.2.2 Targeted Software and Hardware
The targeted software is OpenSSL version 1.1.0g, the latest version at the time of our ex-
periment. After mentioning a major bug on its DSA implementation by [70], and fixing this
bug, OpenSSL’s DSA sign uses constant-time fixed window exponentiation, constant time
Montgomery multiplication and per-message random key. To counter the cache-timing at-
tack, the present DSA implementation enforces scatter-gather technique to access random
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cache line.
We demonstrated our attack on two cell phones: Android based Samsung smart phone
and Android based Alcatel Lucent smart phone; and an ARM embedded device. The clock
frequencies of all of the tested devices are 1 GHz.
4.2.3 Current Status of Mitigation
We notified the OpenSSL teams regarding this attack on the month of March and provided a
fix on the month of May. OpenSSL made a patch with our fix and all of its current versions
of OpenSSL. Therefore, its fork does not have this vulnerability as of now.
4.3 Background
In this section, we provide the general information about DSA implementation and corre-
sponding notations used in this chapter.
Key generation The first phase is a choice of algorithm parameters which may be shared
between different users of the system, while the second phase computes public and private
keys for a single user.
Parameter generation: The first step is to choose an N -bit prime q and L-bit prime p such
that p − 1 is a multiple of q. The next step is to choose g such that the multiplicative
order modulo p of g is q. This value can be obtained by setting g = h(p−1)/q mod p for
some random h which is chosen from the interval h in[1, p− 1]. It is possible to share the
parameters (p, q, g) between different users of the system.
Per-user key: In the second phase of key generation, the implementation computes
private and public keys for a single user. For that purpose, a secret key α is chosen by some
random method, and a public key is computed as y = gα mod p. Here, x is specified to be
in the interval 0 < x < q.
Signing Assuming H is the hashing function and m is the message, signing operation is
done as follows:
81
1. A per-message value k is generated by keeping 1 < k < q in mind.
2. The next step is to calculate r = (gk mod p)mod q. However, the value of r must be
calculated again for a different k if r = 0.
3. As the final step, the computation, s = k−1(H(m) +αr)mod q, must be performed.
Similar to r, s must be calculated again with different k if s = 0.
Verifying During the verification, the first natural check is to control whether the con-
ditions 0 < r < q or 0 < s < q are satisfied. If these conditions are not satisfied, the
signature must be rejected. However, if these conditions hold, for the verification phase,
the following mechanism must be checked: First, we need to compute w = s−1 mod q.
Then, the intermediate parameters u1 and u2 must be calculated by u1 = H(m) · w mod q
and u2 = r · w mod q. The final operation is to obtain the candidate verification key v as
v = (gu1yu2 mod p)mod q. We conclude that the signature is valid if and only if v = r.
From the above operations, verifying does not leak meaningful information to obtain
private key α. During key establishment, given the public key y, and parameters g and
p are known, calculating the private key α requires solving a complex discrete logarithm
problem. Moreover, previously introduced side-channel attacks may not be feasible here
because the private-public key pair is generated once for a session for a given user. The
signing operation is the soft target to obtain private key α. People normally targets modular
exponentiation operation (at item (2) of Example 4.1) to obtain the random nonce k first and
calculate r from their attacks as all others parameters like p, q and g are public. So, when r
and k are known, the remaining part is just solving the well known mathematical equations
to get the private key k from the item (3) of Example 4.1 as all other parameters including
signing message s is known. OpenSSL enforces many optimizations and counter-measures
while computing the signing operation, in particular, the exponential multiplication which
is the most costly operation.
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4.3.1 DSA in OpenSSL
Here, we will focus only on signing part which is the potential target to break private key.
For that purpose, let us examine DSA a bit further. During signing operation, the random
nonce k is generated before computing r, where 1 < k < q. The FIPS (Federal Informa-
tion Processing Standards) 186-3 specifies the length pairs L andN as (1,024, 160), (2,048,
224), (2,048, 256), and (3,072, 256). So, the max length of q, hence for the k, would be
256-bits. To prevent the timing attack mentioned by [31], OpenSSL adds k with q or 2q to
make k constant bit-length. The aim is to avoid time information leakage due to length of k.
Then, it computes the complex exponentiation operation, i.e, gk mod p. The old and naive
1 f o r ( i = 1 ; i < b i t s ; i ++) {
2 i f ( ! BN sqr ( r r , r r , r r , c t x ) )
3 goto e r r ;
4 i f ( B N i s b i t s e t ( k , i ) ) {
5 i f ( ! BN mul ( r r , r r , v , c t x ) )
6 goto e r r ;
7 }
8 }
Figure 4.1: OpenSSL exponential multiplication
implementation of so called square-multiply reads each bit of k and does a square operation
and perform only multiplication operation if the corresponding bit is 1 (as shown in Figure
4.1). The function BN is bit set is used to check whether the ith bit of k is set or not.
Based on ith bit, the function returns the value 0 or 1. In the naive implementation above,
occurrence of squaring tells the attacker that the next bit of the exponent is being used.
Moreover, an occurrence of multiplication indicates the value of the interested bit is 1.
Therefore, an attack, which correctly recovers the square-multiply sequence, can trivially
obtain all bits of the secret exponent. To overcome key dependent branching and prevent
isolation between the two functions BN sqr() and BN mul(), OpenSSL substitutes these
two functions with a Montgomery ladder by implementing BN mod exp mont() func-
tion. In this function, all operations are performed in Montgomery form, and the results
are converted back to the standard representation. With this technique, it reduces some per-
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formance overhead and prevents the isolation between square and multiplication to some
extent.
Even with Montgomery multiplication, the vast majority of execution time for large-
number exponentiation is spent on large-number multiplications. So, optimization tech-
niques to improve performance focus on reducing the number of these multiplications.
Likewise, most of the side channel measurements (e.g. signal samples) are collected dur-
ing large-number exponentiation which corresponds to large number multiplication activ-
ity. Hence, existing side channel cryptanalysis approaches tend to target multiplication
activity. One classical example for this type of attack is FLUSH+RELOAD [68], which
exploits instruction cache behavior.
To improve performance, most modern implementations use window-based exponenti-
ation. For this approach, squaring is needed for each bit of the exponent, however, com-
plex multiplication operation is needed only once for each multi-bit group. Every time
OpenSSL computes a DSA signature, the exponentiation method BN mod exp mont in
crypto/bn/bn exp.c is called. Here, based on the BN FLG CONSTTIME flag value, either
a fixed-window or a sliding-window operation is performed. Then, for finite field op-
erations, BN mod exp mont calls BN mod mul montgomery in crypto/bn/bn mont.c.
After that, the multiply wrapper bn mul mont is called, where assembly code is exe-
cuted to perform low level operations using BIGNUMs for square and multiplication by
default for x64 targets. Since squares can be computed more efficiently than multiplica-
tion, OpenSSL’s multiply wrapper checks if the two pointer operands are the same and,
calls the assembly squaring code (bn sqr8x mont) if the wrapper returns true. Otherwise,
it calls the assembly multiply code (bn mul4x mont).
Figure 4.2 shows the sliding-window implementation of OpenSSL version 1.0.g In this
algorithm, a squaring (lines 5 and 29) is performed for each bit while the multiplication
operation (line 32) is performed only at the (1-valued) LSB (Least Significant Bit) of each
window. After the timing attack described in [31], OpenSSL implemented these multi-
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1 f o r ( ; ; ) {
2 / / Chek i f e x p o n e n t b i t == 0;
3 i f ( B N i s b i t s e t ( p , w s t a r t ) == 0) {
4 i f ( ! s t a r t ) { / / Square
5 BN mod mul montgomery ( r , r , r , mont , c t x ) ;
6 i f ( w s t a r t == 0)
7 break ;
8 w s t a r t −−;
9 c o n t in u e ;
10 }
11 j = w s t a r t ;
12 wvalue = 1 ;
13 wend = 0 ;
14 / / Scan a l l b i t s i n window l e n g t h
15 f o r ( i = 1 ; i < window ; i ++) {
16 i f ( w s t a r t − i < 0)
17 break ;
18 i f ( B N i s b i t s e t ( p , w s t a r t − i ) ) {
19 / / I n c r e m e n t window i f i t i s s e t
20 wvalue <<= ( i − wend ) ;
21 wvalue |= 1 ;
22 wend = i ;
23 }
24 }
25 j = wend + 1 ;
26 i f ( ! s t a r t ) {
27 / / Loop i t e r a t i o n w i n d o w s i z e
28 f o r ( i = 0 ; i < j ; i ++) { / / Square
29 BN mod mul montgomery ( r , r , r , mont , c t x ) ;
30 }
31 / / m u l t i p l i c a t i o n by t a b l e [ windowValue ]
32 BN mod mul montgomery ( r , r , v a l [ wvalue >> 1 ] , mont , c t x
) ;
33 w s t a r t −= wend + 1 ;
34 wvalue = 0 ;
35 s t a r t = 0 ;
36 i f ( w s t a r t < 0)
37 break ;
38 }
Figure 4.2: OpenSSL sliding window implemented in BN mod exp mont() function at
crypto/bn/bn exp.c file. We provide a segment of code where the exponentiation executes
plication routines in such a way that the execution time is barely dependent on the input
parameter passed to the multiplication function BN mod mul montgomery(). But, at
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the time of multiplication, a precomputed table is read to pass the multiplicand. Exploiting
cache behavior, the sequence of a partial key is revealed by [67, 68], and combining with
other techniques as given in [42] helps to reveal full key from this partial key.
1 / / Scan t h e e x p o n e n t one window a t a t i m e s t a r t i n g from
t h e most
2 / / s i g n i f i c a n t b i t s .
3 whi le ( b i t s >= 0) {
4 wvalue = 0 ; /∗ The ’ v a l u e ’ o f t h e window ∗ /
5
6 /∗ Scan t h e window , s q u a r i n g t h e r e s u l t as we go ∗ /
7 f o r ( i = 0 ; i < window ; i ++ , b i t s −−) {
8 i f ( ! BN mod mul montgomery(&tmp , &tmp , &tmp , mont ,
c t x ) )
9 goto e r r ;
10 wvalue = ( wvalue << 1) + B N i s b i t s e t ( p , b i t s ) ;
11 }
12 / / Fe tch t h e a p p r o p r i a t e pre−computed v a l u e from t h e
pre−b u f
13 i f ( ! MOD EXP CTIME COPY FROM PREBUF(&am , top , powerbuf ,
wvalue ,
14 window ) )
15 goto e r r ;
16 /∗ M u l t i p l y t h e r e s u l t i n t o t h e i n t e r m e d i a t e r e s u l t ∗ /
17 i f ( ! BN mod mul montgomery(&tmp , &tmp , &am , mont , c t x ) )
18 goto e r r ;
19 }
Figure 4.3: penSSL constant time window implemented in
BN mod exp mont consttime() function at crypto/bn/bn exp.c file. We provide a
segment of code where the constant-time exponentiation executes.
Concerns about the exponent-dependent square multiply sequences have led to adoption
of fixed window exponentiation in OpenSSL, which combines the performance advantages
of window-based implementation with an exponent-independent square-multiply sequence.
OpenSSL enforces constant time cache access for Montgomery multiplication during fixed-
window computations. A segment of the code is presented in Figure 4.3, where the win-
dow is computed at line 10. This window value is passed to MOD EXP CTIME COPY -
FROM PREBUF, where the access cache is randomized. So, Percival’s attack [67] does not
effective here. Although, Yarom et al. [97] break partial exponent bits in presence of ran-
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domized cache enforcement, they have done thousands of measurements. Recently, Yarom
et al. [70] identify a potential bug of OpenSSL’s BN FLG CONSTTIME flag setting for
DSA signing operation. With this bug, the original control flow goes to sliding window
exponentiation instead of executing constant time fixed-window exponentiation. They ef-
fectively break DSA private key using thousands of measurements. OpenSSL already adds
a patch to fix this bug and current DSA signing operation correctly executes the constant
time fixed-window code.
In summary, OpenSSL enforces optimization in many ways to reduce computation time
for big exponentiation. They enforce different security techniques to counter against many
attack types. They mainly focus on big number multiplication computation, different cache
read, etc. To bring these security and optimization techniques, they introduce some small
logics. We call these as ”glue-codes”, which are executed relatively very brief period of
computation. By identifying this small period of computation, we break secret exponent
bits. For example, we identify signal when computing window value (line 10 Example 4.3)
for fix-window. Similarly, observing the execution of small computations, we identify
when the window starts, the window end, the window value, etc. in case of sliding window.
In the next section, we discuss how we break the key by utilizing the information leakage
through these tiny operations.
4.4 A New Attack
In this section, we present a new technique to get secret exponent used in DSA through the
signing operation. After fixing the bug reported by [70], OpenSSL ensures that the signing
operation always executes constant time exponentiation path. That is why our focus is
on the constant time signing operation which will be explained in detail in the following
(sub)sections.
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4.4.1 EM Data Acquisition
Unintentional EM emanations occur at various frequencies, but of particular importance
is the frequency band centered around the clock frequency of the device’s processor and
memory. The frequency band contains signals that are primarily a function of the instruc-
tion sequence executed by the CPU. Each processor cycle, the CPU draws a current which
is a direct result of the instruction(s) being executed. Much of this instruction-dependent
current is drawn by the CPU clock circuitry and by circuitry which does new computations
(i.e. switches on and off) every CPU clock cycle. This creates a strong current at the CPU
clock frequency which acts as a carrier modulated by the clock-to-cycle variations in pro-
gram activity (i.e. executed instructions). At the CPU and memory clock frequencies (and
their harmonics), the generated EM emanations can propagate far enough to be observed
with a high signal-to-noise ratio. Observing the leaked signal as described in this section,
the emanating device has much in common with a communication system. The reason be-
hind is that the device behaves like a transmitter (inefficiently and unintentionally) which
transmits a message signal carrying information about program activity using a carrier sig-
nal (i.e. the clock signal). We can then receive and demodulate this signal using some
techniques which are exactly same with the ones used in wireless communications. All
EM signals, both in the training phase and in the monitoring phase, are demodulated with
respect to the processor clock frequency, low-pass filtered, and sampled before being sent
for signal processing. We process the signals in MATLAB.
88
4.4.2 Signal Processing 1
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Figure 4.4: The EM signatures of BN mod mul montgomery function, which take al-
most same amount of time irrespective of input.
The first part of the signal processing is to identify the sign/verify area where the window
exponentiation takes place. The major operations of this part is Montgomery multipli-
cation in repeated ways. Detecting where the exponentiation happens can lead to reveal
the bits of nonce key k, which is the only unknown to unveil the private key. In that re-
spect, capturing EM signals during signing operation, and attaining the locations, where
the exponent computation happens, is crucial. We observe that the EM signal for each
exponentiation follows a clear pattern which looks similar and takes similar amount of
time as expected. Keep in mind that, OpenSSL uses the same multiplication function
(BN mod mul montgomery()) for square and multiply with different parameter pass-
ing. This property of OpenSSL demonstrates a unique and visually discernible EM signal
of each function call. We can easily detect this function through visible inspection which
is shown in Figure 4.4. In this figure, we plot a portion of the EM signal captured during
message signing and some of the exponentiation signals. It is clear that the number of
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samples for each operation is almost same.
The multiplication does not help to predict the nonce directly, but it helps to identify
the EM signal locations where either control-flow branching or window value calcula-
tion take place. So, we first need to isolate the signals for Montgomery multiplication
BN mod mul montgomery().
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Figure 4.5: The edge of Montgomery Multiplication constitutes a unique pattern
The first feature of the signal of interest is that it encounters with a sudden increase at
the edge which can be exploited to gather exponentiation locations as seen in Figure 4.5.
However, utilizing only this feature of the signal does not provide enough information to
detect the edges accurately. Another feature we observed is that there exists a unique sig-
nature signal before the edges where the signal exhibits a sudden increase. This signature
signal is shown in the dashed black box in Figure 4.5. As the amplitude of EM signal
for this pattern could vary for different multiplication, we create a template for this pat-
tern where the pattern for multiplications contains 30 samples. Combining both of these
features helps us to find the edges of the signal of interest successfully. For that purpose,
we first calculate the derivative values of the captured EM signal at each sample point
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and determine the candidate edge points by comparing their derivative values with a given
threshold. Later, we check whether these candidate edge points are locally maximum. We
eliminate the ones which have comparably small value in a given locale. As the second
step, we check the correlation of the candidate edge signals with the signature signal given
inside the dashed black box in Figure 4.5. We calculate the correlation of this template with
the measured signal at the candidate edge points to identify all edges in a signing operation.
After applying a threshold to the correlation values of the candidates, the remaining points
are assigned as the edges of the signals of interest.
It is important to identify all the multiplication edges without any false positive or any
false negative, as a single false positive or false negative will result random prediction for
the key. We find that more than 99% time we can detect the multiplication edge correctly.
We evaluate the correct edge detection for each signing by a magic number. Remember that,
OpenSSL add q or 2q with randomly generated nonce k and makes the k with exactly q-bit
length (256-bit in our case), so that there will not be any timing information for different
k for different signing operations. As the window size (defined by OpenSSL) is 4 for
256-bit exponent k, that means there will be consecutive four squares and there will be a
single multiplication after each 4th square operation. That means we should have exactly
320 (256 + 256/4) multiplication for the calculation of exponentiation part for a single
signing operation. So, we evaluate the edge detection correctness with this number and
we completely eliminate those signatures where we detect some more or less (which is the
case of 1%) edges.
4.4.3 Recovering Nonce k
When we compute the multiplication edge correctly, this signifies that we locate the sig-
nal that corresponding to window value calculation and this window value is nothing
but the exponent bits. As shown in Example 4.6, the sequence of the operations are:
large-number multiplication used for squaring (line 10), then compute window value (line
91
1 i n t B N i s b i t s e t ( c o n s t BIGNUM ∗a , i n t n )
2 {
3 i n t i , j ;
4 b n c h e c k t o p ( a ) ;
5 i f ( n < 0)
6 re turn 0 ;
7 i = n / BN BITS2 ;
8 j = n % BN BITS2 ;
9 i f ( a−>t o p <= i )
10 re turn 0 ;
11 re turn ( i n t ) ( ( ( a−>d [ i ] ) >> j ) & ( ( BN ULONG) 1) ) ;
12 }
Figure 4.6: OpenSSL BN is bit set() function which check if a given bit is 0 or 1
12) followed by fetching pre-computed value from a table, and finally updating the re-
sult through large-number multiplication (Line 21). So, we essentially have three tran-
sitions here: square-windowComputation-square, square-windowComputation-tableFetch
and multiplication-square. This transition happens in a unique pattern. For example,
for 256-bit DSA signing operation, window value is 4 (OpenSSL defines default win-
dow values for different exponent bits for performance optimization). The sequence of
transitions are: square-windowComputation-square, square-windowComputation-square,
square-windowComputation-square, square-windowComputation-tableFetch, multiplication-
square. The sensitive information, i.e window value of nonce k is executed when the tran-
sition has windowComputation. So, we are only interested in the transitions of square-
windowComputation-square and square-windowComputation-tableFetch. We can isolate
these transitions easily as every 4th transition is a table look-up and every 5th transition is a
multiplication. After isolating the transitions, we are only interested at the edge where the
windowComputation happens. The window is computed at the edge of multiplication. As
we have seen that the isolation of this multiplication is quite easy, we can claim that small






Figure 4.7: The centroid for two different snippets when the window is computed for 0 and
when the window is computed for 1
We first capture this snippet which corresponding to window computation. The window
is always shifted left and added with 0/1 based on the return value of BN is bit set func-
tion. This function check a bit of a BIGNUM which represents by array of machine words.
To read the nth bit value, first it locate the memory word location (line 7) and then it iden-
tify the bit position (line 8) in that memory word (Example 4.6). To calculate the value of
that bit, it is right shifted by its potion so that the bit becomes the least significant position
of that machine word (line 11), followed by masking with 1. We found that this function
together with addition of the return value have different signatures while it computes the
bits 0 and 1. To account for other value-dependent segments in the signal, in each such set
of snippets we cluster similar signals together and use the centroid of each cluster as the
reference signal. We use the K-Means clustering algorithm and the distance metric used for
clustering is Euclidean distance (sum of squared differences among same-position samples
in the two snippets). Due to noise propagation and data dependency from different parts,
we observe that snippet for 0 computation itself has different signatures, which is also same
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for the computation of 1 as well. So, we make 10 sub-cluster for 0 and 10 sub-cluster for
1 bit computations. We calculate the centroid of each sub-cluster. Increasing the number
of sub-clusters can cause overfitting or overlapping of two centroids corresponding to bits
0 and 1. Therefore, the number of sub-clusters is chosen carefully to differentiate between
the centroid of 0 computation and the centroid of 1 computation and to avoid the given
problems. This differentiation can be identified successfully in a high bandwidth signal
given SNR is high enough (Fig 4.7).
4.5 Evaluation
4.5.1 Experimental Setup
We run the OpenSSL application on Android cell phones like Alcatel [51] and Samsung [50],
and an IOT device (A13-OLinuXino board [52]). The Alcatel has quad-core 1.1 GHz Qual-
comm Snapdragon processor with Android OS (version 6) and the Samsung has single-core
800 MHz Qualcomm MSM7625A Chipset with Android OS (version 5). The A13- OLin-
uXino board is a single-board computer that has an in order, 2-issue Cortex A8 ARM
processor [53] and runs Debian Linux operating system. It is commonly used as a platform
for prototyping IOT systems.
Our experimental setup receives EM signals by a lab made small electric probe. We
place the probe very close to the monitored system (see Fig. 3.7). The signals collected by
the probe are recorded with an Infiniium S-Series Oscilloscope (Keysight DSOS804A [54]).
Our decision to use an oscilloscope was mainly driven by its existing features, such as
built-in support for automating measurements, saving and analyzing measured results, vi-
sualizing the signals when debugging code, etc. The detection algorithm was implemented















Figure 4.8: DSA nonce k prediction accuracy for Fix-window
To evaluate the effectiveness of our approach, we selected the latest version of OpenSSL
(1.1.0g, at the time of our experiment), all its versions and forks (e.g. LibreSSL and Bor-
ingSSL). We choose (L, N ) pair as (3072, 256), so the max length of q, hence for the k,
would be 256-bit. We create an application that uses OpenSSL crypto library through stan-
dard API provided by OpenSSL and all parameters and public-private pairs are generated
through command line utilities (like: # openssl dsapair , # openssl gendsa, etc.).
We first check how efficiently we can detect the nonce k. The nonce is randomly gener-
ated for each message signing and it is unknown but known to be unknown in our evaluation
process. We use 50 signing instances for a given private key for training purposes for each
devices. We use 50 randomly generated nonce for training. Each signing generates 256
snippet and total 256*50 snippets are used for training. Now we perform the actual testing
where we detect unknown but known to be unknown nonce. We define our accuracy as the
fraction of exponent we correctly recover. For a given DSA private key we sign 50 differ-
ent messages and collect 50 different EM traces for these 50 signing operations. For each
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signing operation, we found most of the bits correctly detected and we miss maximum 2-bit
( 99.2% worst case accuracy) for OLinuXino and maximum 3-bit for Samsung as shown in
Figure 4.8. We found the worst case accuracy (missed maximum 12 bits) for Alcatel cell
phone is around 95%. This is mostly because of activities on the other three cores interferes
with the activity on the core doing DSA signing. But, in the best case situation, we found at
least one correct nonce. This situation happens when the device does not have any interrupt
at the time of signing (this happens in a fraction of second) and when snippet identification
can not be ruined by other’s core activity. We found that we get at least one correct nonce
across all devices, and this is really important to retrieve private key.
4.5.3 DSA Key Recovery
There is a direct relation between the secret key and the calculated nonce which is given as
α = (sk − z)/r mod q
where all are known except k which is predicted from the signal snippet. We calculate
the private key α by using the nonce k predicted from our signal processing. Signing
multiple messages under the same key is common when the key is fixed by a public key
infrastructure. The correct key is obtained as follow:
• Estimate different k for each signing with a given α,
• Obtain the candidate α by inserting the estimated nonce k,
• Repeat the process until at least two candidate α’s are exactly same with each other.
The idea for the procedure above is that as the set of all possible values of the private key
are too large, obtaining two equal values for the private key given the incorrect estimation
of two different nonce k is highly unlikely.
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Figure 4.9: DSA private key prediction accuracy for Fix-window.
We implement the above relation in python by using python crypto library and calculate
α by using known values s, z, r and q and predicted value k. To see how robust our
technique is, we test 50 DSA private keys. We break 50 keys with 10 signing operations
for Samsung, 3 signing operations for OLinuXino, and 50 signing operations for Alcatel
on average. A single key is broken in 2 seconds (average) on mac-book pro with 2.7 GHz
Intel Core i5.
4.6 Counter-measure
We focus our mitigation efforts on the fixed-window implementation, which is the imple-
mentation of choice in the current version of OpenSSL, and already mitigates the problem
of exponent-dependent square-multiplication sequences, and timing variation. Some po-
tential mitigations thus include circuit-level approaches that reduce the effect of the differ-
ences in computation, additional shielding that attenuates the emanated signals to reduce
their SNR ratio outside the device, deliberate creation of RF noise and/or interference, etc.
We do not focus on these mitigation techniques because they increase overall cost, weight,
and/or power consumption of the devices. Moreover, these techniques are difficult to apply
97
to devices that are already in use, and may not provide protection against the side chan-
nel attacks due to emanated EM signals but through a different physical side channel (e.g.
power).
An alternate approach to mitigate the attack is to minimise the attackers ability to pre-
cisely locate the brief snippets of signal, which correspond to examining the bits of the
exponent during an exponentiation operation, and constructing the value of the window.
For that, our main focus is on different implementation techniques for the OpenSSL library
to circumvent the attacks based on emanated EM signals. In the following subsections,
we thoroughly discuss the possible techniques and their results obtained from experimental
demonstrations.
4.6.1 Window compute randomization
1 i n t B N i s b i t s e t r a n d o m i z e d ( c o n s t BIGNUM ∗a ,
2 i n t n , i n t wsize , i n t rnd ) {
3 i n t i , j ;
4 / / S e t a l l b i t s t o 1 e x c e p t t h e l e a s t s i g n i f i c a n t w s i z e
b i t s
5 BN ULONG rmask = ˜((1<<wsize )−1) ;
6 b n c h e c k t o p ( a ) ;
7 i f ( n < 0)
8 re turn 0 ;
9 i = n / BN BITS2 ;
10 j = n % BN BITS2 ;
11 i f ( a−>t o p <= i )
12 re turn 0 ;
13 /∗ Randomize a l l b i t s e x c e p t t h e LSB (0− t h p o s i t i o n ) ,
14 t h e n s e r o o u t b i t i n p o s i t i o n s 1 t h r o u g h w s i z e − 1
15 ∗ /
16 re turn ( i n t ) ( ( ( ( ( a−>d [ i ] ) >> j ) )
17 ˆ ( rnd & ( ˜ 1 ) ) ) &((BN ULONG) ( rmask +1) ) ) ;
18 }
Figure 4.10: penSSL modified BN is bit set() function which check if a given bit is 0 or 1
in presence of random mask.
In this approach, we try to mitigate the attackers ability to distinguish between the
signals whose computation has the same control flow but uses different values for the ex-
98
1 /∗
2 We compute window v a l u e as 32− b i t v a l u e and t h e n c u t
3 t h e window l e n g t h v a l u e form t h a t
4 ∗ /
5 / / Genera te 32 words o f random numbers
6 i f ( ! BN rand ( rnd , 1024 , BN RAND TOP ANY ,
7 BN RAND BOTTOM ANY) ) {
8 goto e r r ; ;
9 }
10 whi le ( b i t s >= 0) {
11 wvalue = rnd−>d [ b i t s %32] ; /∗ a ’ random ’ v a l u e o f t h e
window ∗ /
12 f o r ( i = 0 ; i < window ; i ++ , b i t s −−) {
13 i f ( ! BN mod mul montgomery(&tmp , &tmp , &tmp , mont , c t x )
)
14 goto e r r ;
15 / / C a l c u l a t i n g window i n p r e s e n c e o f random v a l u e
16 wvalue = ( wvalue << 1) +
17 ( B N i s b i t s e t r a n d o m i z e d ( p , b i t s , window , rnd−>d [
b i t s %32] ) ) ;
18 }
19 /∗
20 Un−mask t h e window v a l f i r s t and t h e n
21 f e t c h t h e a p p r o p r i a t e pre−computed v a l u e from t h e pre−b u f
22 ∗ /
23 i f ( ! MOD EXP CTIME COPY FROM PREBUF(&am , top , powerbuf ,
24 ( wvalue & ((1<<window ) −1) ) , window ) )
25 goto e r r ;
26 }
Figure 4.11: OpenSSL modified constant time window computation in
BN mod exp mont consttime() function, where window is computed in presence of
random mask and un-mask the window value before using it.
ponents bit. In this regard, the attack benefits significantly from the limited space of pos-
sibilities for the value returned by BN is bit set there are only two possibilities: 0 or 1.
Based on this observation, we create a mitigation approach that puts a random value into
the upper bits (those not used for the actual window) of the value returned by BN is bit set
itself (line 17 of Figure 4.10), which in turn creates a much larger space of possibilities for
the operands of instructions that use BN is bit sets return value and the value of wvalue
itself, and yet allowing the correct value of wvalue to be recovered by masking out those
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higher bits (line 24 of Figure 4.11). Since these random bits outnumber the exponents bits,
in each of the values where exponent bits are present, the variation in signals caused by dif-
ferences in these random bits is significantly stronger than the variation due to the values














Figure 4.12: Bit prediction accuracy of nonce k when we add randomness in bit reading
and window value computation.
This mitigation adds only a few instructions for each bit of the exponent, so it increases
the overall executing time of the exponentiation by only 0.4% while, the recovery rate for
the exponents bits decreases to between 60% and 70% as shown in Figure 4.12. Although
we reduce the accuracy from 100% to 70%, it is still high (note that a 50% rate or recovery
is equivalent to randomly choosing the recovered value of each bit). The possible reason for
this high accuracy in the presence of randomization is that each iteration window is com-
puted for a single bit, and there are only two possibilities (0 or 1) for the unknown variable.
Our k-mean algorithm is strong enough to choose the correct cluster to identify the value
of executed bit and, there are other parts of the code which is unchanged which contributes
to the overall signal signature. Moreover, unbiased predictions of a variable with two pos-
sibilities always have 50% accuracy with random guess, therefore, with k-mean technique
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and with high data accusation device, improving accuracy 20% is not a surprise. So, we
need to increase the possible prediction window rather than two possibilities ( 0 and 1), for
that we should not compute single key bit while computing w-bit window of key.
4.6.2 Never compute single bit window
The idea is that if we manage to compute a chunk of key, for example, w-bits (in this case,
w = 4) then the range of prediction window becomes 2w. OpenSSL already implements a
function to compute word length window of a key as defined in Example 4.13.
1 / / # i f d e f i n e d ( SPARC T4 MONT )
2 s t a t i c BN ULONG b n g e t b i t s ( c o n s t BIGNUM ∗a , i n t b i t p o s )
3 {
4 BN ULONG r e t = 0 ;
5 i n t wordpos ;
6 wordpos = b i t p o s / BN BITS2 ;
7 b i t p o s %= BN BITS2 ;
8 i f ( wordpos >= 0 && wordpos < a−>t o p ) {
9 r e t = a−>d [ wordpos ] & BN MASK2;
10 i f ( b i t p o s ) {
11 r e t >>= b i t p o s ;
12 i f (++ wordpos < a−>t o p )




17 re turn r e t & BN MASK2;
18 }
19 / / # e n d i f
Figure 4.13: OpenSSL word length window computation.
The function BN get bits(p, bits) takes a structure pointer of the BIGNUM which is
the exponent, and the position of the bit, and return the 32-bit integer (in case of 32-bit
machine) value of the exponent at position inclusive as last bit. The BN get bits code
does work little and big endian both for any window size. In the original code, OpenSSL
made this function only for SPARC machine, we uncomment the ifdef part and make it for
ARM and X-86 machine for testing. We make a little bit of modification in fix-window
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1 whi le ( b i t s >= 0) {
2 b i t s −=window ;
3 wvalue= b n g e t b i t s ( p , b i t s +1) ;
4 f o r ( i = 0 ; i < window ; i ++) {
5 i f ( ! BN mod mul montgomery(&tmp , &tmp , &tmp , mont , c t x )
)
6 goto e r r ;
7 / / Remove window c o m p u t a t i o n B N i s b i t s e t ( ) from here
8 }
9 /∗
10 window v a l i s word l e n g t h , l e t us f i r s t crop t h e
11 window−s i z e l e n g t h and t h e n f e t c h t h e a p p r o p r i a t e
12 pre−computed v a l u e from t h e pre−b u f
13 ∗ /
14 i f ( ! MOD EXP CTIME COPY FROM PREBUF(&am , top , powerbuf ,
15 ( wvalue & ((1<<window ) −1) ) , window ) )
16 goto e r r ;
17 }
Figure 4.14: OpenSSL modified constant time exponentiation where window is computed
word length size.
code to adopt this function as shown in Example 4.14. The change we made is to replace
BN is bit set(p, bits) function with BN get bits(p, bits). The bits is first decremented by
window length (bits− = window) before the function is called.
The BN get bits code always returns a full integer worth of bits so it should be more
resilient to side channel attacks. There is no much control flow exist in the function and
it does perform some bit wise binary operations. Comparing with the original function
BN is bit set(p, bits), the new used function BN get bits(p, bits) has a few extra instruc-
tions to be executed. On the other side, as you see in Figure 4.14, this function is called
once for each window. As we reduce the number of function call, overall executing time
of the exponentiation is reduced by 0.25% while we reduce bit prediction below 50% as
shown in Figure 4.15. The reason for this significant prediction accuracy reduction is that
with the single cropped edge and the single function call, we need to predict 24 = 16 pos-
sible values. As the new function does not introduce any control flow and the new function
execution time is almost same with the previous one, total number of EM samples is not
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Figure 4.15: Bit prediction accuracy when we compute 4-bit window by calling the func-
tion single time for the each window.
4.6.3 Compute window for entire key
We have seen that the window is computed at the edge of big multiplication BN mod exp mont(),
and capturing the information leak corresponding to the window computation (although a
few sample points) is possible because isolation of big multiplication is trivial. We have
also seen at the top of this section that inserting randomness does not bring a perfect so-
lution. Moreover, adding randomness also causes slow down of the window computation.
So, one good solution would be tried is to avoid window computation at the edge of the
multiplication as much as possible.
Towards this end, we adopt two types of implementations without any change in BN is bit set(p,
bits) routine. We only re-order the code structure of the relevant part of the OpenSSL fix-
window as shown in Figure 4.16. As, we have not added or deleted any code, there is
no performance change with this code structure. However, there is an impact on the key
prediction. The window is computed at edge of each 4th multiplication (in case of DSA
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1 whi le ( b i t s >= 0) {
2 wvalue = 0 ; /∗ The ’ v a l u e ’ o f t h e window ∗ /
3 /∗ Scan t h e window , s q u a r i n g t h e r e s u l t as we go ∗ /
4 f o r ( i = 0 ; i < window ; i ++) {
5 i f ( ! BN mod mul montgomery(&tmp , &tmp , &tmp , mont , c t x )
)
6 goto e r r ;
7 / / Remove window c o m p u t a t i o n here
8 }
9 / / Computing wvalue f o r window l e n g t h b i t s he re
10 f o r ( i = 0 ; i < window ; i ++ , b i t s −−) {
11 wvalue = ( wvalue << 1) + B N i s b i t s e t ( p , b i t s ) ;
12 }
13 i f ( ! MOD EXP CTIME COPY FROM PREBUF(&am , top ,
14 powerbuf , wvalue , window ) )
15 goto e r r ;
16 }
Figure 4.16: OpenSSL modified constant time exponentiation where window length wvalue
is calculated in a loop without changing BN is bit set() function.
where window size is 4). So, first of all, we need to crop the edge of each 4th multiplication
and other edge is re-relevant as there is no key computation at the other edges. For each
cropped edge, there would be 24 = 16 possible values. We apply a dictionary based pre-
diction technique and the result is presented in Figure 4.17. Here, bit prediction accuracy
will reduce inherently, as there are more possible candidates. The other reason is that the
consecutive 4-bit window computation (calling BN is bit set() function 4 time in a loop) is
faster than that of computing them at the edge of each multiplication because of processor
cache warm-up. After warming-up for the first function call, the processor cache does not
need to spent for warming up time for the remaining function call 3 times and, hence, the
execution of the entire 4-bit window computation is very fast comparing to its counterpart.
As the execution is fast, the total number of EM signature samples does not increase in
proportional way. We have found that the total number of EM sample corresponding to
window computation is barely 35-40, whereas it was about 30 sample points in the case
of previous implementation. One thing is worthful to mention that, computing the 4-bit
window outside the multiplication edge will still make each 1st bit of the window (by using
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Figure 4.17: Bit prediction accuracy when we compute 4-bit window by consecutive calling
the function 4 times.
As the bit computation at the multiplication edge is problematic, other variation of this
category counter-measure would be to compute all window values before the exponentia-
tion loop started as shown in Figure 4.18. Here, we have not introduce any extra instruction
or code but, use the same code to calculate window values and keep them into an array. The
advantage of this type of implementation is that scanning the entire key, and computing all
window is very fast, and it would be very difficult to identify the signal corresponding to
window computation. As we have seen that multiplication edge performs a lot of operation
and its edge detection is relatively easy, the window computation for the entire key in a
loop takes very small amount of time. This is because it executes the same operation again
and again, and takes advantage of cache warming-up. Since we could not detect this key
dependent computation with confidence, key prediction is not applicable in this case.
In summary, we should be careful before computing key dependent computation even
it is a very small segment of the code. Our take off from the above experimental results are:
1) Window bit computation is necessary to calculate the memory read from pre-computed
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1 /∗ We c r e a t e a l l window v a l u e s and keep i n wvalue a r r a y ∗ /
2 i n t windowIndex = ( b i t s +1) / window ;
3 i n t wvalue [ windowIndex ] ;
4 whi le ( b i t s >= 0) {
5 winVal = 0 ;
6 f o r ( i = 0 ; i < window ; i ++ , b i t s −−) {
7 winVal = ( wvalue << 1) + B N i s b i t s e t ( p , b i t s ) ;
8 }
9 windowIndex −= 1 ;
10 wvalue [ windowIndex ] = winVal ;
11 }
12 windowIndex = ( b i t s +1) / window ;
13 whi le ( b i t s >= 0) {
14 /∗ Scan t h e window , s q u a r i n g t h e r e s u l t as we go ∗ /
15 f o r ( i = 0 ; i < window ; i ++ , b i t s −−) {
16 i f ( ! BN mod mul montgomery(&tmp , &tmp , &tmp , mont , c t x ) )
17 goto e r r ;
18 / / Remove window c o m p u t a t i o n here
19 }
20 /∗ Fe tch t h e window v a l u e from wvalue a r r a y ∗ /
21 i f ( ! MOD EXP CTIME COPY FROM PREBUF(&am , top ,
22 powerbuf , wvalue[−−windowIndex ] , window ) )
23 goto e r r ;
24 }
Figure 4.18: OpenSSL modified fix-window exponentiation where all window is computed
first and then modular exponentiation loop is executed.
value to make the algorithm faster. But, try to avoid single bit computation of a given key
as its prediction is simpler because of having only two choices (0 or 1, Section 4.6.1). 2)
even single bit computation is effective when all of the bits are computed consecutively.
In this case, the computation will be so fast to get enough sample point of EM signal
for breaking the key (Section 4.6.3). 3) Lastly, we choose to compute window length
size for the window computation with a single function call, and consider it as the best
mitigation (Section 4.6.2). This mitigation is effective because it forces the attacker to
attempt recovery of tens of bits from a single brief snippet of signal, rather than having a
separate signal snippet for each individual bit.
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4.7 DSA With Bug
As mentioned in [70], there could be a lot of devices which do not update the recent
OpenSSL patches and still can run the flaw OpenSSL codes. These codes still execute
the sliding window exponentiation for DSA signing operation. So, we put our efforts to
break DSA key where signing uses sliding window operation as well.
Let us try to understand the control flow of the sliding window operation. The imple-
mentation presented in Figure 4.2) computes the window (line 14 - 24) with the constraints
that window size is at most the bit length defined in the window variable, and the first and
last bits of the window are 1. It squares as many window size (line 28 - 30). Next, it per-
forms a single multiplication with a precomputed value followed by bit manipulation. This
ensures that it scans the next bit to be processed (line 32 - 38). Here, it checks whether there

















Figure 4.19: The control flow of sliding-window.
We can present the control flow of the code with a control-flow graph (Figure 4.7). In
the graph, the window computation (line 14 - 24) is presented by Swc, the state S0 signifies
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the computation of the 0 bit between two consecutive windows (line 3 - 10). The state
Sss represents consecutive square (line 28 - 30) and, finally, the state Ssm indicates the
multiplication followed by variable update (line 32 - 38).
The state S0 can be reachable from S0 and Ssm and, we denote them with labels S0→0
and Ssm→0, respectively. Similarly, the state Swc is reachable through the states S0 and
Ssm and, we demonstrate them with labels S0→wc and Ssm→wc, respectively. Obviously,
Swc can be achieved from the state Start which is the initial and obvious case, so we
are ignoring this transition. The two transitions Swc→ss and Sss→ss make the state Sss
reachable. Moreover, there exists only one transition to reach Ssm which is denoted as
Sss→sm.
Each of these state transitions has meaningful information to break the key. For exam-
ple, transition S0→0 and Ssm→0 signify the 0’s between two consecutive windows. Sim-
ilarly, the transitions S0→wc and Ssm→wc signify the starting of the window computation,
therefore the computation of bit 1. The only transition Sss→sm signifies that the multiplica-
tion after the last square of the window, which means the least significant bit of that window
is bit 1. The transitions Swc→ss and Sss→ss do not directly say anything about which bit is
in consideration, but these transitions are used for error correction. For example, the tran-
sition Sss→ss provides information about the window length, whereas the transition Swc→ss
inherits the starting bit of the window. These information are useful when we encounter a
wrong prediction.
By observing the sequences of these transitions, we can partially detect the key. For
example, the sequences of . . . Ssw→wc, Swc→ss, Sss→sm, Ssm→0, S0→0, S0→wc, Swc→ss,
Swc→ss, Swc→ss, Sss→sm . . . means the key is ...1?1001??1....
Now real question is, how many bits can be detected by observing these sequences?
Here is the calculation: if we correctly identify all transitions, we should know all 0’s
between windows and all 1’s at the beginning and the end of windows. So, we should have
at most 2 unknown bits (Figure 4.20, left) for window length 4 which is the case of DSA
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algorithm. These unknown bits only inside the window. We used OpenSSL to generate
random keys 1000 times and observed that these sequences reveal approximately 65% and
70% of the key-bits when the window size is 4.
Window 
Length, L
Window Computation Unknown    
BitsBit 1 Bit 2 Bit 3 Bit 4
1 1 0 0 0 0
2 1 1 0 0 0
3 1 X 1 0 1
4 1 X X 1 2
1






1 for (i = 1; i < window; i++) {
2 if (wstart - i < 0)
3 break;
4 if (BN_is_bit_set(p, wstart - i)) {
5 wvalue <<= (i - wend);
6 wvalue |= 1;









Figure 4.20: The number of unknown bit based on window length (left) and the control
flow inside the window computation (right).
Still, more than 30% of the key bits will be unknown if we do not detect bits inside the
window computation. Window computation determines the size and the value of the win-
dow. This window computation has distinct control flows for computing 0 and computing
1 (line 14 - 24 in Figure 4.2) which is shown in Figure 4.20. We separate the state Swc into
two states B0 and B1. State B0 checks the bit with the function call BN is bit set(). If the
window bit is 1, it executes some codes and transits to state B0; we call this transition as
SB0→B1 . If the bit is 0, it stays on the same state B0, and scans the next bit. We refer this
transition as SB0→B0 . For the 4-bit DSA window, this loop is executed for 3 times. So,
correct prediction of transitions SB0→B1 and SB0→B0 will result in full nonce prediction.
4.7.1 Nonce Prediction from Sliding-window
We first train our system. We execute 1000 times signing operation for a given private key
and capture the signals as discussed earlier. There are 1000 randomly generated nonce, but
known to us to use them to create a large training set. First, we isolate the transitions and
label them accordingly. For each signing, we get average 45-50 transitions of each type.
Around 45K of transition (having each type) snippets are used for training.
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During the prediction phase, we predict unknown nonce. We isolate the corresponding
snippets in the same way we discussed. Next, we predict the transition labels for these snip-
pets using 1-Nearest Neighbor (1-NN) algorithm with Euclidean distance as the distance
metric. As the transitions have certain constrains, we perform the predictions for a given
























Initial Prediction Prediction after Correction
Figure 4.21: Different events prediction for sliding window.
Phase I Prediction: Here, we predict the nonce bits inside the window. That means we
predict all transitions S0→0, Ssm→0, S0→wc, Ssm→wc and Sss→sm. For that we tested 160
randomly generated nonce and achieve 99.52% accuracy for these transition predictions.
We observe that any control flow execution can be reached through, and can be followed
by only a few allowed control flow paths. For instance, transitions S0→wc and Ssm→wc
must be followed by the transition Swc→ss. Likewise, the transition Sss→wc can occur only
after the transitions of Swc→ss (for single bit window) or Sss→ss (for window size more
than 1-bit). Hence, we can identify the predictions which do not fit with their neighbors
and potentially fix them accordingly. This is done in prediction correction. In prediction
correction, we treat each prediction as a part of the CFG, rather than an individual entity.
First, we apply a rule based algorithm to identify any mismatch (i.e. the predictions which
do not match with their neighboring predictions). Next, we try to fix the mismatch by
altering the predictions into an allowable sequence of control flow. We need to note here
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that while making changes to the original predictions for an acceptable control flow path,
our goal is to minimise the number of these changes. This improves the average prediction






















Figure 4.22: Window value prediction.
Phase II Prediction: Here, we perform a fine grained control flow analysis which we
call the window value prediction. First, each window computation (transitions of S0→wc
and Ssm→wc) are identified using the basic control flow prediction. Then, the prediction for
the values (SB0→B1 and SB0→B0) are computed. Unlike other transitions (which executes
at the edge of big multiplication), the window value is computed in a loop (three times
for window size of four), but at a single multiplication edge. These execution is very fast
and the single snippet represents the three transitions of SB0→B1 or SB0→B0 . So, we detect
the snippet as a whole window value rather than each bit( remind that we need maximum
2-bit to detect). We achieve 98.8% accuracy as shown in Fig 4.22. Finally, combining both
Phase I Prediction and Phase II Prediction, we correctly predict 252-bit out of 256-bit
nonce (Fig. 4.23).
4.7.2 Mitigation
The sliding window implementation for DSA algorithm has a lot of detectable control flow.
We can not avoid them simply because it considers various optimization techniques to re-






















Figure 4.23: The accuracy for DSA nonce k prediction. In the worst case, we missed 7-bit
out of 256-bit nonce.
choose a large window length to mitigate window value prediction to some extent. As
we discussed above and in Section 4.6.3, consecutive window computation (for example,
6-bit window will have 24 = 16 combination) does not increase the number of training
EM snippets extraordinarily, but it causes many combinations which results in accuracy
reduction. Unfortunately, increasing window size will also reduce the performance of the
code. Therefore, there exists a trade-off between the security and performance optimiza-
tion. Keep in mind that we can not compute the window computation with a single function
call unlike constant time window computation as discussed in Section 4.6.2. The reasons
can be listed as the length of the window is not fixed, the length is unknown until we read
the bit or compute it.
4.8 Conclusion
In this chapter, we present a potential flaw of an widely used open source PKC imple-
mentation like OpenSSL. While there are various optimization considerations and counter-
measures enforced for OpenSSL PKC implementation, there still exist some so called
”glue-codes” which exhibit key dependency. Capturing and identifying emanated signals
while executing these ”glue-codes” make it possible to break PKC implementation. In par-
ticular, we consider DSA implementation as a use case, which utilizes constant-time mod-
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ular exponentiation. To evaluate the robustness and effectiveness of our attack, we captured
EM emanations on two mobile phones and an embedded system, which execute OpenSSL
DSA sign/verify operations. We retrieve almost all of the DSA private key with maximum
three EM traces for all devices except the Alcatel one (which we need a few more traces
due to other core activities). We thoroughly describe different mitigation techniques and
implemented them on top of the OpenSSL libraries. We demonstrated different mitiga-
tion techniques with experimental results (security and performance). These embrace the
importance of re-thinking before designing and implementing PKC, in general.
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CHAPTER 5
NAF BASED OPENSSL AND IT’S VULNERABILITY
5.1 Abstract
Before switching to constant-time implementations of point multiplication during ECDSA
signing, non-adjacent form (NAF) based point multiplication was utilized by OpenSSL.
This chapter presents a side-channel attack that recovers the secret ephemeral secret scalar
(nonce) used in the elliptic curve point multiplication by a scalar in ECDSA, using the sig-
nal that corresponds to a single signing operation of OpenSSL. In this work we have shown
that NAF based implementation is completely exploitable, where 100% of secret nonce can
be retrieved. We further have shown that wNAF (where w = 3) based implementation is
partially exploitable, where 70% of secret nonce can be retrieved.
5.2 Motivation
Physical side channel attacks exploit the physical side-effects of computation to extract
sensitive information, such as cryptographic keys, that is used during that computation.
The physical side-channel signals include electromagnetic emanations, which are created
by changes in the current flows within the computational device [56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61],
variations in power consumption [26, 62, 63, 64], acoustic emanations [65, 30], and temper-
ature variation [66]. Most prior physical side-channel attacks exploit the large differences
in signals that are created when program execution takes different paths depending on a
condition that reveals information about the secret key. For example, some attacks exploit
the changes to the sequence of large-number square and multiply during modular ex-
ponentiation in RSA [67, 68], ElGamal [69] and DSA [70] implementations. Analogously,
changes to the sequence of elliptic curve (EC) point double and add operations, as well
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as other control flows that leak information about the scalar during the EC point multi-
plication by a scalar, have been exploited to attack prior implementations of EC-based
cryptographic algorithms [71, 73, 74, 72]. Other (non-physical) attacks on earlier imple-
mentations of ECDSA include exploiting secret-dependent differences in cache behavior
(memory access patterns) [75, 76, 77, 78]. Finally, in some attacks the message of the
base EC point is chosen by the attacker in a way that produces values with distinguishable
signals in the EC point double and add operations during EC point-scalar multiplication.
To mitigate these side-channel attacks, in recent versions of cryptographic packages,
such as GnuPG/libgcrypt and OpenSSL, point and message blinding is applied prior
to performing point-scalar multiplication, to prevent chosen-message and chosen-base-
point attacks. For performance reasons, instead of a binary double-and-add implemen-
tation, both libgcrypt and OpenSSL have used an implementation based on the non-
adjacent form (NAF) of the scalar until recently. In the NAF representation the scalar is
still represented as a sequence of digits, but each digit now represents multiple bits of the
scalar. After pre-computing the value of the point multiplied by each of the possible value
of a digit, the NAF-based implementation requires only one point-add for each non-zero
digit in the NAF representation of the scalar, and this significantly reduces the number
of point-add operations that are needed for the overall point multiplication. However, the
pattern of accesses to the table of pre-computed point values now directly corresponds to
the NAF representation of k, which allows cache-based attacks to easily recover k [75, 77,
78, 76]. Furthermore, the point-add is still skipped for a zero-valued NAF digit in k, so
the sequence of point-double and point-add operations still leaks partial information about
k. This has been exploited by analog side channel attacks, where partial information from
multiple signing operations (that use the same private key dA, but different scalars k) was
combined to eventually recover dA [72].
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5.2.1 Our Contributions
This chapter evaluates a side-channel vulnerability by analyzing the signal that corresponds
to a single ECDSA signing operation for different NAF versions of OpenSSL. Specifically,
our attack 1) identifies the signal snippet that corresponds to each instance of the double
and add operation, 2) determines each invert signal snippet which corresponding to negative
odd digits of NAF..
We experimentally evaluate this attack for OpenSSL, for an IoT development board,
using as training only two signal snippets, one for a point-scalar multiplication step where
the add operation executed, and one where the double operation executed. These training
signals were collected by executing an EC point-scalar multiplication, with a known value
of the nonce, on another physical instance of the target device.
5.2.2 Targeted Software and Hardware
The software we target is the latest stable released versions of OpenSSL (version 1.1.0h).
The curve we use in our experiments is the secp256k1 curve for OpenSSL. However,
ECDSA signature computation, regardless of curve equations and choice of a base point,
have no material impact on our attack as they use the same point-scalar multiplication, and
thus the same NAF, program code.
The hardware we target is an ARM-based IoT prototype board (A13-OLinuXino), run-
ning under Debian Linux. We consider our attack to be a non-intrusive but close-proximity
attack, as the probe in our experiments is placed in close proximity to each target device,




5.3.1 Overview of ECDSA
In this section, we provide the general information about ECDSA implementation and cor-
responding notations used.
Key generation: The first phase is a choice of algorithm parameters which may be
shared between different users of the system, while the second phase computes public and
private keys for a single user.
Parameter generation: Initially, two parties must agree on the curve parameters (CURVE,
G, n) where G is a base point of prime order on the curve and n is the multiplicative order
of the point G. The order n of the base point G must be prime. So, curve parameters
(CURVE, G, n) are public and shared between different users of the system.
Per-user key: In the second phase of key generation, the implementation computes private
and public keys for a single user. For that purpose, a secret key d is chosen by some ran-
dom method in the interval [1, n − 1], and a public key curve point (Q) is calculated as
Q = d×G. We use × to denote elliptic curve point multiplication by a scalar.
Signing: Signing operation on message m is done as follows:
1. Calculate e = HASH(m) where HASH is a cryptographic hash function. Let z be
the Ln leftmost bits of e, where Ln is the bit length of the group order n.
2. A per-message crypto graphically secure random value k is generated from [1, n−1].
3. The next step is to calculate the curve point (x1, y1) = k × G. Calculate r =
x1 mod n. However, the value of r must be calculated again for a different k if
r = 0.
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4. As the final step, the computation, s = k−1(z + r × d) mod n, must be performed.
Similar to r, s must be calculated again with different k if s = 0.
5. The signature is the pair of (r, s).
When computing s, the string z resulting from HASH(m) shall be converted to an integer.
Verifying: During the verification receiver first check the sender’s public curve point
Q. The receiver checks three things to decide whether the curve point is valid or not: (1)
checks Q is not equal to identity element O, (2) checks that Q lies on the curve and (3)
checks that n×Q = O. After that the receiver follows these steps:
1. Verify that r and s are integers in [1, n− 1]. If not, the signature is invalid.
2. Calculate e = HASH(m) where HASH is the same function used in the signature
generation. Let z be the Ln leftmost bits of e.
3. Calculate w = s−1 mod n, u1 = z × w mod n and u2 = r × w mod n
4. Calculate the curve point (x1, y1) = u1 × G + u2 × Q. If (x1, y1) = O then the
signature is invalid.
5. The signature is valid if r ≡ x1 (mod n), invalid otherwise.
5.3.2 Point Multiplication by a Scalar
The naive implementation of EC point multiplication is shown in Figure 5.1.
In this implementation of point multiplication, for each bit of the scalar k, the previous
result r is doubled and, if the bit in k is non-zero, the point p is added to that result.
The point-double and point-add operations differ in both the code that is executed and
the data that is accessed, so various side channels can be used to recover the sequence of
these operations and, from that sequence, recover the bits of the scalar k. For example,
instruction cache accesses can be used to determine when each point-double and point-add
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1 E C p o i n t z e r o ( r ) ; / / r=0
2 / / For each b i t o f t h e s c a l a r k
3 f o r ( b= b i t s −1;b>=0;b−−){
4 E C p o i n t d o u b l e ( r , r ) ; / / r =2∗ r
5 i f ( B N i s b i t s e t ( k , b ) )
6 E C p o i n t a d d ( r , r , p ) ; / / r = r+p
7
8 }
Figure 5.1: A naive double-and-add implementation of EC point multiplication by a scalar.
function call occurs, the timing of data cache accesses to p can be used to determine which
point-double operations are followed by point-add operations (note that p is only accessed
during a point-add), and various analog side channel signals can be used to determine when
each point-double and point-add is executed.
To optimize the performance and, more importantly, to mitigate against side-channel
attack, OpenSSL enforced so called 1-ary non-adjacent form (WNAF) implementation of
scalar by point multiplication. The non adjacent form [98] is a generalization of the binary
representation of integers, allowing for three possible digits, -1, 0, and 1, referred to as
NAF digits, and requiring that every pair of non-zero digits is separated by at least one
zero digit. For example, the 4-digit NAF representation of 7 is (1,0,0,-1) compared to its
binary representation (0,1,1,1). For the implementation in OpenSSL, it first computes the
negative part of the base point and does add with positive counterpart of base point when
scalar bit is 1. When scalar bit is -1, it does add with negative counterpart of the base
point. However, OpenSSL implemented wNaf with weight w so that each non-zero digit
could have 2w possible values in the interval of (+2w − 1, -2w + 1). It pre-computes all
the positive odd number, and re-uses these values when add operation is performed. The
length of the pre-computed table depends on the value of w.
As there are only two possible values for each add location (with the value of w =
1), by employing specific methods, the nonce k can be retrieved if you know the exact
add location correctly. For example, Genkin et. al [72] break wNaf implementation of
119
OpenSSL, and they evaluated their approach with PC by measuring the signals with lower
bandwidth side-band. Similarly, Yarom et. al breaks OpenSSL wNaf implementation for
scalar by point multiplication with w = 1 by using FLUSH+RELOAD technique [75, 77,
78, 76].
5.4 How NAF Based Implementations Are Vulnerable
Figure 5.2 shows OpenSSL’s wNAF implementation of ECDSA. We have three control flow
branching here: (1) just doing double (at line 3), (2) double followed by only add (line
3 and line 21) and (3) double followed by invert and then add (line 3, line 13 and line
21). The significance of these three control flows are as: (1) says the location if 0 bit, (2)
says the location of odd digits and (3) signifies that if the odd digits are positive or negative
in sign. If we identify these three control flows correctly, we can predict all digits of wNAF
with w = 1, because odd digits will have only two choices: +1 and -1. In case of wNAF
with w = 3, identifying these three control sequences will end up with 4 possible guess of
odd digits (1, 3, 5 and 7).
The side channel signal used in our attack consists of electromagnetic (EM) emanations
created by the victim system’s processor as it executes instructions. The signal is collected
using our custom-made high-gain probes that are placed just outside be the victim system’s
(unopened) case. The signal from the probe is then filtered, down-converted, and digi-
tally recorded using an off-the-shelf software-defined radio (SDR) receiver, such that the
recorded signal samples correspond to several megahertz (MHz) of radio-frequency band-
width around the victim system’s processor clock frequency. The recorded signal is then
digitally filtered and demodulated before it is subjected to the custom signal analysis that
implements our attack.
The first step in the signal analysis is to identify the part of the signal that corresponds to
the overall point-by-scalar multiplication. This can be trivially accomplished by changing
the source code of OpenSSL to create a highly recognizable signal pattern just before and
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1 f o r ( k b i t = max len − 1 ; k b i t >= 0 ; k b i t −−) {
2 i f ( ! r i s a t i n f i n i t y )
3 E C p o i n t d o u b l e ( group , r , r , c t x ) ;
4 i n t d = wNAF[ i ] [ k ] ;
5 i n t i s n e g ;
6 i f ( d ) { / / f o r non−z e r o key v a l u e
7 i s n e g = d < 0 ;
8 i f ( i s n e g )
9 d = −d ;
10 i f ( i s n e g != r i s i n v e r t e d ) {
11 / / i n v e r t i f b i t changed
12 i f ( ! r i s a t i n f i n i t y )
13 E C p o i n t i n v e r t ( group , r , c t x ) ;
14 r i s i n v e r t e d = ! r i s i n v e r t e d ;
15 }
16 i f ( r i s a t i n f i n i t y ) {
17 / / F i r s t ADD w i t h base p o i n t
18 E C p o i n t c o p y ( r , v a l [ i ] [ d >> 1 ] ) ;
19 r i s a t i n f i n i t y = 0 ;
20 } e l s e / / add o p e r a t i o n
21 E C p o i n t a d d ( group , r , r , v a l [ i ] [ d >> 1 ] , c t x )
22 }
23 }
Figure 5.2: OpenSSL NAF Based Implementation.
just after the point-by-scalar multiplication function is called during an ECDSA signing
operation, or to record a high-resolution time-stamp and identify the corresponding real-
time point in the signal. However, in most realistic attack scenarios such modification of
the victim’s code would not be possible, so instead we execute the victim code as-is, and
identify the point-scalar multiplication purely through signal analysis.
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DOUBLE - ADD Operations
ADD DOUBLE DOUBLE
Figure 5.3: The EM signatures of add-double
The key observation for this signal analysis is that most of the execution time in point-
scalar multiplication is spent on repeated point-double and point-add operations in OpenSSL,
and these point operations are designed such that all instances of their execution have as
little variation as possible in their execution time, control flow path, and data access pattern.
If a training sample of a point-double and point-add is available, we can use moving corre-
lation with that sample to identify the part of the signal that contains an appropriate number
of repetitions of the sample. In our experiments we find that the point-double, point-add
are long enough, and have enough prominent signal features (Figure 5.3), to only require
one training sample of each, i.e. the training signal corresponds to the work for only one
instance of signing operation using a single k, and we do not need the knowledge of the
value of k. We have used about five for each add and double instances.
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10 -3 ECC-WNAF NON-INVERT
Figure 5.4: The add without invert operation
The next step in our analysis is to identify the parts of the signal that corresponds to
invert operation. The invert itself is too large so that we can reliably detect it as it
is executed between a point-double and a point-add, more specifically it either executes at
the beginning of add or does not execute. There is a prominent signature for invert
as shown at Figure 5.5. Moreover, total length of add signal becomes larger (around
60 sample-points) comparing to the add signal snippet without invert (5.4). We use
moving correlation with that sample to identify the add without invert and the add
with invert. To identify the add with or without invert, we apply moving correlation
methodology by exploiting the snippet given in Figure 5.5.
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Figure 5.5: The add with invert operation
After detecting (1) double, (2) add and (3) invert, we try to predict the nonce
k. As we mentioned, we can detect all bits of k when it is used wNAF with w = 1, that
means the odd digit has only two choices +1 and -1. With the choice of w = 3 which
is the case of OpenSSL (version 1.1.0h), the odd digits has 8 choices (-1, -3, -5, -7, 1,
3, 5 and 7) and there should be at least 3 consecutive zeros before one odd digit appears.
With our detection technique, we know the position of 0 and odd-digits, that means it
will reveal at least 75% of nonce bit. We have not tried to break the full nonce, as our
motivation was to analysis of security weakness for different NAF implementations. All
of our experiments are taken with a single trace observation and without doing any post
processing, mathematical formulation or brute-force method to find the full nonce value.




NAF based point multiplication is heavily exploited for ECDSA signing before switching
to constant time implementations of point multiplication. This chapter presents a side-
channel attack that recovers the secret ephemeral secret scalar (nonce) used in the elliptic
curve point multiplication by a scalar in ECDSA, using the signal that corresponds to a
single signing operation of OpenSSL. In this work we have shown that NAF based im-
plementation is completely exploitable, where 100% of secret nonce can be retrieved. We
further have shown that wNAF (where w = 3) based implementation is partially exploitable,
where 70% of secret nonce can be retrieved.
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[37] O. Aciiçmez, c. K. Koç, and J.-P. Seifert, “On the power of simple branch prediction
analysis,” in Proceedings of the 2nd acm symposium on information, computer and
communications security (asiaccs), ACM Press, Mar. 2007, pp. 312–320, ISBN: 1-
59593-574-6.
128
[38] K. Gandolfi, C. Mourtel, and F. Olivier, “Electromagnetic analysis: Concrete re-
sults,” in Proceedings of the third international workshop on cryptographic hard-
ware and embedded systems, ser. CHES ’01, London, UK, UK: Springer-Verlag,
2001, pp. 251–261, ISBN: 3-540-42521-7.
[39] J. Balasch, B. Gierlichs, O. Reparaz, and I. Verbauwhede, “DPA, Bitslicing and
Masking at 1 GHz,” in Cryptographic hardware and embedded systems (ches), T.
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